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This project was undertaken to help satisfy a desire of
the researcher to learn more about a Middle Eastern country-
deserving much attention today, Iran. His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi is the major actor in Iranian
decision-making and as such was the focus of this project.
The "operational code" approach of Professor Alexander L.
George provided the model used to examine the political be-
lief system of the Shahanshah, and then this set of beliefs
was applied to a qualitative content analysis of English-
language Iranian press sources to discern the monarch's ap-
proach to political activity on the local, regional, and
global levels.
The research indicates that Mohammed Reza Shah, acutely
aware of the twenty-five centuries-old Persian kingship
tradition, is striving to modernize his nation while strength-
ening its international standing. Independence from foreign
influence marks Iranian domestic and foreign policies, and
careful exploitation of the nation's oil riches has enabled
the Shah to develop his country so that it now is a major
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His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah
(King of Kings) and Aryamehr (Light of the Aryans), is a
most important personality in the Middle East. The Iranian
monarchy and indeed Iran itself, has contributed enormously
to the world during the last 2500 years. Iran, traditionally
known as Persia, in the course of its twenty-five centuries
of existence has been both the nucleus of a widespread empire
and at times an ineffective, undeveloped country subject to
foreign exploitation.
The approach used here to gain understanding of modern
Iran—as personified by the Shahanshah--is the "operational
code" construct derived by Alexander George from work by
Nathan Leites. [Refs. 55 and 56] This essentially is a
means to examine a personality's instrumental and philosophi-
cal beliefs in order to understand how, in George's words,
"The actor's beliefs and premises. . .serve, as it were, as a
prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses
of the flow of political events, his definitions and esti-
mates of particular situations." [151:191]
Before developing an "operational code" for the Shahanshah,
background information concerning the socio-political climate
in which Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ascended Iran's Peacock Throne
and began his reign at the age of twenty-one was studied.
Significant events during his early reign including a power
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struggle with Prime Minister Mossadegh in the early 1950'
s
and the Shahanshah's programs of social reform and moderniza-
2
tion embodied in the White Revolution.
The "operational code" is more meaningful when developed
considering this background. Once formed, the code serves
as a basis from which to view the Shahanshah's political
actors. This research project examined actions involving
the neighboring states, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East,
the Indian Ocean region, the Third World states, and the
industrialized nations.
Transliteration is a problem which must be addressed by
any researcher involved with the English rendering of words
of Farsi or Arabic origin. With this researcher having no
background in either of these Middle Eastern languages, the
approach used here has been to use the spellings most common-
ly encountered in English sources or as found in the English-
language editions of the Iranian press.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3
Cyrus the Great, son of Cyrus I who established the
Achaemenid Dynasty, successfully unified what is now Iran
and extended his empire by conquest in the sixth century,
B.C. Ancient Persia came in conflict with first the Greek
and then the Roman Empires. In the seventh century A.D.
Arabs invaded Persia bringing Islam. During its long history
the Persian Empire has had periods of greatness interrupted
by periods of corruption and decline.
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Various dynasties have developed, flourished and receded
during Persia's existence. The Qajar Dynasty emerged in 1796;
the present Shah describes the Qajars as "by far the weakest
of the major Persian Dynasties" and credits them with nearly
ruining the country by financial mismanagement and encourage-
ment of foreign intervention." [67:26]
Persia at the beginning of the twentieth century was but
a shadow of the former magnificent periods. European nations
were quick to exploit the riches of the region by taking ad-
vantage of the inept leadership of the last Qajars. The
Russian Czars had long held designs on the warm water of the
Persian Gulf, and by the end of the nineteenth century,
Russian influence was strong in northern Persia. In the
south j Britain was developing its interests in the commercial
and petroleum potentials of the area and also was concerned
with Russian activity so near to India.
Britain and Russia were able to formalize their spheres
of influence in Persia with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of
1907. Each power agreed to respect the other's interests
in Persia including the many trade concessions which had
been granted by the Qajar rulers.
The founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty (and the present
Shah's father) literally rose through the ranks. Reza Khan,
later Reza Shah Pahlavi, enlisted in the Persian Cossack
Brigade as a teenager. His father and grandfather both had
served in the army. Through "force of character and his

dominant personality" he was able to move from the enlisted
to the officer ranks. [67:36] Reza Khan worked to rid his
brigade of its Russian leadership and then he became its
commander in August 1920. His rise continued as he endeavored
to free Persia from foreign domination, and he began a mili-
tary advance on Teheran. As a result, the government yielded
on 21 February 1921 with Reza Khan becoming Minister of War
and Commander-in-Chief of the army. In 1923 he assumed the
duties of Prime Minister, and the National Assembly declared
him Shah on 13 December 1925 after deposing Ahmad Shah six
weeks earlier.
Reza Shah Pahlavi's coronation as Shahanshah, Shadow of
the Almighty, Vice Regent of God , and Center of the Universe
occurred on 24 April 1926. His son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
became the Crown Prince at that time. The son writes that
"it seems that the era, the people, and the necessities of
a nation demand that at a certain time the right man be
found in a particular position: such a man as will profound-
ly affect the fate of a country and modify the course of
history." [67:3$] He strongly believes that his father
was such a man at such a time.
The founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty undoubtedly possessed
.
a very strong, energetic, and overpowering personality.
During his sixteen-year reign, he worked to unite his country
once again by subordinating the locally-powerful leaders,
who paid only token allegiance to the central government.
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Reza Shah also endeavored to modernize Persia despite foreign
presence. He retained the parliament established by the 1906
constitution, but he probably dominated that body with his
overwhelming character while he proceeded to modernize Iran.
As one study of Iran notes, "While Iran had a const ituion
guaranteeing a representative form of government since 1906,
its Majlis, until the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 > was
almost completely the creation and the rubber stamp of the
Shah." [37:33]
The German offensive against Russia in 1941 greatly dis-
turbed the Allies. The rich oil fields of the Caucasus were
endangered, and the Allies feared that Germany would push in-
to Iran to keep oil from flowing to the Allies. In 1940 and
early 1941 the British and Russian governments warned Reza
Shah of the dangers of allowing Germans to work in Iran. In
August the two Allied powers entered Iran from the south and
the north respectively to secure a supply route from the
*
Persian Gulf to Russia.
The Iranian forces were overwhelmed and Iran quickly
acquiesced to the change in its fortunes. The Allies an-
nounced a week in advance that they would enter Tehran on 17
September. On the sixteenth the Majlis received the notice
that Reza Shah had abdicated; his son succeeded him. The
29 September 1941 edition of Time Magazine included the fol-
lowing comment on Reza Shah's abdication. "Reza, a choleric
old man, admitting officially to 65 years, probably closer
to 75, had for 16 years fought to keep control of Iran. Now
11

he well knew that, beaten by the British and Russians, he
could not deal with the domestic turmoil that his defeat
would produce. By abdicating he at least saw his son to the
throne." [241:23]
C. GOVERNMENT 5
The government of Iran is a constitutional monarchy, but
not in the same sense as Great Britain with its monarchy
primarily a ceremonial head of state. Iran's may best be
described as a "working monarchy" functioning within a cons-
titutional framework. The Shah has powers which are deline-
ated in the 1906 constitution: he appoints the Prime Minis-
ter, other ministers, and many government officials; he is
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; he has veto power
and can dissolve the National Assembly and/or the Senate re-
quiring new elections; and he can wage war and conclude
peace. He is also the most important figure in the govern-
ment. [81:251]
The Majlis, or legislative body, consists of two houses.
The National Assembly delegates are elected by the people
from districts determined by population. Of the Senate dele-
gates, one-half represent Tehran and the remainder represent
the provinces. The Shah has the power to appoint one-half




D. MOHAMMED REZA SHAH
1. Youth and Early Reign
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had grown up under his father's
tutelage for Iran's Peacock Throne. His glowing description
of his formidable father in Mission for My Country is a testi-
mony to his respect for Reza Shah. He recognizes his father's
efforts to force Iran to face "the modern world, rather than
trying to escape from it through an inertia that led straight
towards national oblivion." [67:44]
The young Shah ascended the throne just prior to his
twenty-second birthday. He had been born on 26 October 1919
in Tehran and lived with his family until he became Crown
Prince six years later. At that time his father placed him
in a specially established military primary school, and he
received a French governess who "opened my mind to the spirit
of Western Culture." [67:52] His education continued in
Switzerland from 1931 to 1936 where "the democratic Western
environment moulded my character to an extent that was second
only to my father's influence." [67: 60] In Switzerland he
developed his athletic ability in addition to studying and
increasing his awareness of the West. On returning to Iran,
the Crown Prince completed his education at the Military
College of Tehran, graduating in 1938 as a Second Lieutenant.
The early years of the young monarch's reign were not
easy for him. The educational, judicial, social, and govern-
mental reforms initiated by his father were only a first step
13

towards modernization in what was, by Western standards, a
backwards nation. The young monarch, recognizing that his
father's position of neutrality became moot when British and
Russian forces occupied the country, agreed to a tripartite
alliance formalizing the status of his two "Allies." In
January 1941 Time Magazine reported the event by saying,
"Twenty-two-year-old Mohammed Shah Pahlavi, the Allies'
straw man in Iran, proved last week that he is not too young
to understand affairs. .. .He had sense enough to know on which
side his throne was buttered." [224:29]
Iran's social and economic sufferings which resulted
from the "accomodation" of Allied resupply movements to
Russia were recognized at the November 1943 Teheran Confer-
ence. The joint communique cited the Iranian contribution
to the war effort and foretold economic aid for Iran. During
the conference Stalin offered Soviet tanks to the Shah; how-
ever, the latter was concerned about the Soviet crews which
would accompany the equippment and remain indefinitely. He
therefore declined the offer. [67: $0] The country did bene-
fit greatly from post-war economic and military aid from the
United States through the L end-Lease program.
n
2. Mossadegh and the Oil Crisis
During the Second World War the British and Russian
representatives effectively controlled Iran by co-opting the
candidates to the National Assembly* The Shah consulted Dr.
Mohammed Mossadegh to be Prime Minister but the British
14

thought it unwise to change the government, and Mossadegh
would not accept without British endorsement. [67:36-87]
Mossadegh proceeded to help organize a National Front move-
ment and associated himself with the Communist-oriented Tudeh
Party for a power base.
Iran received some American financial aid in 1950,
but the Shah felt that his visit to Washington in 1949 to re-
quest substantial aid had failed "because the Americans
realized that we were not yet handling our internal affairs
with the necessary firmness." [67:^9] In November 1950
Iran concluded a twenty million dollar trade agreement with
the Soviet Union to bolster Iran's financial position.
The Shah was plagued by domestic unrest in the early
1950' s. Negotiations to increase Iran's profits from the
British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were unproductive and in
1951 the oil industry was nationalized. The first Seven-Year
Plan for development was in financial difficulty with only a
portion of the aid requested by the Shah forthcoming from
the United States. The National Front, in the guise of
Iranian nationalism, contributed substantially to the civil
unrest.
The Shah's Prime Minister, Razmara, was assassinated .
by an extremist group supporter of Mossadegh on 7 March 1951.
His successor. Hussein Ala, was able to function for only two
months in the face of Mossadegh's opposition. The Shah once
again approached Mossadegh to become Prime Minister, and the
latter this time accepted.
15

The political change did not significantly help the
domestic or the international situations. In his autobio-
graphy the Shahanshah characterizes Mossadegh as apathetic,
illogical, and endowed with a spirit of negativism. [67:&2ff]
However, the Shah appears to have had little control over
the governing of Iran during Mossadegh's two years in office.
On 17 July 1952 Mossadegh resigned because the Shah "dared"
to refuse the former's demands to become Minister of War and
to have the right to govern without the consent of the Majlis
for a six month period. Riots greeted his successor, and
Mossadegh was reinstated five days later with his demands
met.
The oil industry, in particular, suffered under
Mossadegh. He adamantly insisted on ousting foreigners,
but the country did not have the technical skill to run the
industry. His policies led him to break diplomatic rela-
tions with Great Britain in October 1952, and the oil indus-
try remained virtually idle.
The Shah seems to have felt compelled to support
Mossadegh during this period. The riots which followed the
latter' s resignation and the threat of civil war were
probably adequate indicators to the Shah that his power to
effectively govern was very limited. The Shah states of
Mossadegh, "I wanted to give him every opportunity to deve-
lop a constructive oil policy." [67:95] But during that per-




The Shah also recounts, "In February 1953 he
[Mossadegh] suggested that I temporarily leave the country.
In order to give him a free hand to try out his policies,
and to gain a little respite from his intrigues, I agreed."
While a direct confrontation with Mossadegh might have been
fatal to the then heirless Pahlavi Dynasty, indirectly the
Shah was able to enhance his position. He continues, "Some-
how the people had learned the secret of our planned depart-
ure. The ensuing mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah
were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for
the time being." [67:97] The Shah appears to have spent much
time at two residences, built by his father, near the Caspian
rather than in Teheran during this period. Whether willingly
or perforce, he gave Mossadegh a free hand to pursue his
"negative" policies.
In August 1953 the Shah finally made a stand against
Mossadegh. On the thirteenth the Shah signed two decrees,
one dismissing Mossadegh and the other naming General Zahedi
as his successor. The Shah gave the responsibility for de-
livering the decrees to the Commander of the Imperial Guard,
Colonel Nassiry.
The arrival of the news in Teheran resulted in street
fighting between forces supporting Mossadegh and those loyal
to the Shah. The civilian populace also participated active-
ly. However, the Shah and his Queen had departed before the
results of the conflict were known. "It had been decided
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weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist
his disposition, we would temporarily leave the country."
[67:104] The royal couple fled to Rome to await the outcome
of the short-lived conflict, and within a week the Shah was
able to return to his capital in triumph.
3. Social Reform and Modernization
The popularity of the Shah was a decided asset as he
endeavored to lead his country. In contrast to Mossadegh's
negativism, the Shah evolved a policy of. "positive national-
ism." This "implies a policy of maximum political and econ-
omic independence consistent with the interests of one's
country." [67: 12 5] The first Seven-Year Plan had stalled
under Mossadegh; the Shah revived it and in 1956 implemented
a second plan.
The Shah believes that social justice includes a
basic right to food, shelter, clothing, education, and medi-
cal care. His social reform programs have been instituted
based on these principles. In 1950 he started a program to
turn much of his extensive land holdings over to peasants.
This program also stalled under Mossadegh, but by its comple-
tion in 195$ about 2 5,000 peasant farmers had received over
500,000 acres of land. [68:33] In i960 the Shah tried to
have an extensive land reform act passed by the Majlis de-
signed to limit the size of private holdings, but the bill
eventually passed was so diluted that it was inadequate.
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The most ambitious and significant reform program insti-
tuted by the Shah was what has become known as the "White
Revolution." This originally was a six point program which
the Shah submitted to his subjects in the form of a referen-
dum on the Sixth of Bahman 1341 (26 January 1963 ) . Impetus
for the revolution is summed by the Shah: "The realization
came to me that Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolu-
tion that could, at the same time, put an end to all the
social inequalities and all the factors which caused in-
justice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction
which impeded progress and kept our society backward." [63:15]
When the Shah announced his reform referendum, he anti-
cipated "that the forces of black reaction and red destruc-
tion would attempt to sabotage this programme, the former,
because they wished the nation to remain submerged in abject
poverty and injustice, the latter because their aim was the
complete disintegration of the country." [63:36]
Despite the nearly unanimous results in favor of the
referendum, riots broke out in June 1963 » and on 10 April
1965 an assassination attempt was made on the Shah as he was
entering the Marble Palace. The former incident the Shah
attributes to "black reaction" and the latter to "red des-
truction."
The six original provisions of the White Revolution were
the following: large scale land reform, nationalization of
forest and pasture acreage, sale of shares in national
19

factories to help finance land reform, labor reforms includ-
ing profit-sharing by factory workers, electoral reforms to
achieve a greater degree of democracy and to enfranchise
women, and educational reform including the creation of a
"Literacy Corps" to educate the rural population. Six addi-
tional reforms measures have been added to the continuing
Revolution of the Shah and the People: the establishment of
"Houses of Equity" to arbitrate local matters and to reduce
the judicial burden; the "Health Corps" to provide rural
medical care; a "Reconstruction and Development Corps" to
aid in the development of the land redistribution under the
land reforms; nationalization of the nation's waterways; in-
stitution of a program for reconstruction of the countryside;
and educational and administrative reforms directed toward
satisfying the demands of Iran's growing middle class. [112:
24ff]
The Shah developed many of his views concerning social
reform when he was young. He is a strong believer in demo-
cratic principles encompassing three areas. Political democ-
racy requires an intelligent, mature, honest, tolerant, and
vigilant population with a sense of a mission. [67:169-73]
Economic democracy "implies a great many independent entre-
preneurs engaged in a wide variety of industry and commerce."
[67:179] Social democracy requires that "every man, woman,
and child in this nation is entitled to a decent minimum of




Mohammed Rez Shah Pahlavi has developed his statesman-
ship skills tremendously during the three decades that he
has occupied Iran's Peacock Throne. When he succeeded his
father, there was little that he could hope to accomplish
domestically with his largely illiterate population subjected
to British and Russian occupation. At the end of the war,
Iran had barely started to attain the modernization goal
originated by Reza Shah and continued by his son.
The power struggle waged by Mossadegh during his unpro-
ductive term as Prime Minister delayed progress in Iran.
After Mossadegh's ouster, Mohammed Reza Shah seemed to be
more determined to actively govern his country. The wide-
spread reforms instituted as part of the White Revolution
have done much to improve the domestic situation in Iran;
however, the country still has much work to do.
Today, the Shah appears to be very popular with his sub-
jects, and he has emerged as a prominent leader in world af-
fairs. While he is directing domestic progress, he is
strengthening his military position. The Shah is also mak-
ing effective use of Iran's petroleum resources. During the
recent Arab oil embargo Iran benefited from its freedom to
pursue its own interests as a non-Arab state.
The Pahlavi Dynasty has become much more secure than it
was during the uncertain period of World War II. The Shah's
first and second wives did not provide a male heir, but his
21

present wife, Empress Farah, is the regent-designate for
their elder son, Crown Prince Reza Cyrus.
In October 1967 the Shah felt that his country had pro-
gressed sufficiently that, after 26 years as Shah, he would
finally have a formal coronation. Before the event the
Shahanshah told Time Magazine ,'"! have always thought, and
often said, that it is not a source of pride and gratifica-
tion to become king of a poor people. In the past I felt
that a coronation ceremony was not justified. But today I




E.A. Bayne notes "The term Arya Mehr is usually inter-
preted as 'Light of the Aryans,' and was instituted. . .as a
substitute for the Western concept of 'majesty,' which does
not transliterate into Farsi easily." [12:17]
2
So called because of its bloodless nature.
For more detailed information see References 34 > 63, and
References IS and 22 provide detailed information.
For more detailed information see Ref. 81.
The Senate did not exist in fact until 1949 and first
met in 1950.
n
His Imperial Majesty's autobiography [Ref. 67] is the
primary source for this section; see also General Hassan Arfa's
account [6:3^5ff].
d
This concept possibly stems from Islamic or Zoroastrian
dualism; see [l6:54]»-

II. THE "OPERATIONAL CODE"
A. METHODOLOGY
One of the key contributors to the understanding of the
behavioral aspects of decision-making is Nathan Leites. His
research of the elite political group in Soviet Russia, the
politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, led
him to publish two works early in the 1950' s. Both The Opera-
tional Code of the Politburo [Ref . 55] and A Study of
Bolshevism [Ref. 56] developed and employed the "operational
code" methodology as a means to examine the belief system
with which the Soviet leadership functions. The first work
was primarily concerned with the codification of the elite
beliefs, tactics, strategies, and values by means of quali-
tative content analysis of Politburo action accounts and state-
ments of Lenin and Stalin. The second utilized this frame-
work, going much farther to discern the meaning and the deve-
lopment of Bolshevism and the "Bolshevik character."
Alexander L. George of Stanford University has since dis-
tilled Leites' concept of the "operational code" to make it a
valuable research tool for studying an elite's belief system
as an important although not exclusive, component of the
actor's decision-making behavior. The "operational code"
approach does not provide a means to predict actions in
specific cases; however, it does, as George notes, enable
"the investigator to clarify the general criteria require-
ments, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing
24

opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimat-
ing the costs and risks associated with them, and in making
utility calculations." [151:200]
Two types of beliefs comprise the code: philosophical
and instrumental. Philosophical beliefs are determined from
a set of five questions regarding the actor' s views of the
nature of politics; the instrumental beliefs involve a more
detailed examination of his political style concerning calcu-
lations and strategies, also using five key question sets.
Together these ten questions comprise George's model for
2developing an actor's operational code.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
1. What is the nature of the actor's political universe?
The "political universe" in which an actor functions
is an important influence on his belief system. Central to
this is the actor's perception of his political opponents'
capabilities are most important since "the characteristics
the political actor attributes to his opponent [exercise] a
subtle influence on many other philosophical and instrumental
beliefs in his operational code. [151:201-02]
The Shah ascended the Peacock Throne during a period
of growing conflict; the European eruption of World War II
had sent disruptive shock waves toward Iran. Germany, with
strong technical-support ties with Iran, eyed the then-weak
state as a valuable source of petroleum. Similarly, the
Allies recognized the value of this Middle Eastern state;
25

they were first to act militarily both to secure a supply
route to the Russian Front and to prevent Germany's takeover
of the territory. In his autobiography the Shah refers to
Iran's seeming unavoidable occupation: "If the Allies had
not sent huge quantities of war materials through Persia in
aid of the Russian, probably the German spring offensive of
1942 would have succeeded, and just as probably the Germans
would have invaded my country." [67:63]
This, however, was not the first time in this century
that European nations had intervened in the internal affairs
of Iran. Britain and Russia were able arbitrarily to divide
Persia, then under the terms of Qajar Dynasty, into two
spheres of influence separated by a "neutral zone" under the
terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Also, "neutral"
Iran suffered the ravages of the First World War. The Shah
has observed, "Foreign interests, naturally, were best served
by a weak central government incapable of protecting the
country's rights against foreign invaders." [93:3 Mar. 75]
The present international situation remains on of
3
conflict. The uneasy Arab-Israeli cease-fire is still a long
way from peace, and the leader of Iran recognizes the poten-
tially dangerous situation developing as a result of the ram-
pant inflation affecting the industrialized world and its
trading partners. He reportedly told delegates to the 1974
Ramsar Conference on revision of the Fifth Plan, "We know
well that we cannot be happy in a world consisting of poor,
26

shattered nations. If the world and civilisation we know
now crumbles in ruin or goes bankrupt, no one will emerge un-
scathed from the chaos." [93:10 Aug. 74]
His Imperial Majesty has a well developed conception
of the forces of "black reaction" and "red destruction" which
he sees as a very real threat to his life and to his reign.
The communist-oriented Tudeh Party is outlawed in Iran, and
saboteurs are not tolerated by the government. The Shah's
5
efficient security force, the SAVAK, is an active deterrent
to internal subversion. The Shah's dominance of Iranian
decision-making, his involvement at all levels of government
and the workings of the long-established Iranian bureaucracy
make it difficult for would-be political opponents to estab-
lish a viable power position.
2 . How does the actor assess the probability of success-
ful realization of his political goals and aspirations ?
The Shahanshah projects enthusiastic optimism regard-
ing this question, optimism tempered slightly by objective
realism. Source of much of this optimism is an appreciation
of Iran's position as a world leader in petroleum production.
Oil revenues enable the Shah to finance his extensive moderni-
zation and reform programs and are the single most significant
factor in Iran's dramatic development into a world financial
power in recent years. A Kayhan International article report-
ing the revision of the 1353 (1974-75) budget stated, "The
Government's ability to double the size of the budget late
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in the year was due entirely to considerably higher revenues
from the oil and gas sectors." [93:7 Dec 74]
Indicators of the Shah's optimism are the repeated
references to (and the implied comparisons with) the great
Persian empire developed twenty-five centuries earlier by
Darius and Cyrus. Perpetrating the tradition of Persian
kingship as unbroken during the interim helps to legitimize
the still-new Pahlavi Dynasty; but connection with the an-
cient glory also helps to establish a focal point for present
development in Iran—to once again be a major international
actor. The Shahanshah's coronation after twenty-six years
of rule, the lavish anniversary celebration at Persepolis
commemorating 2 500 years of Persian monarchy, and the "Great
Civilization" goal are manifestations of optimism regarding
the eventual realization of the Shah's goals.
The tempering realism surfaces in the monarch's
statements acknowledging that the rate of progress in Iran,
rapid as it has been, has practical limits. For example, in
a recent British Broadcasting Corporation interview the
Shahanshah remarked that "we are progressing in such a way
that it would be very difficult to criticise things other
than the weakness of human nature. .. .They [the people of
Iran] are only human, they are not machines that you can tune
at the momentum that you want." [93:14 Dec 74] Shortages of
manpower in many technical fields, the continued high illiter-
acy rate especially in rural areas, and economic drains
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resulting from defense procurement are all significant. A
report on the revised Fifth Plan budget states, "The Govern-
ment will try to meet manpower shortages by much expanded
educational facilities, better utilisation of women in the
work force, and where necessary and as a temporary measure,
the import or skilled labour from abroad." [93:7 Dec 74]
His Imperial Majesty intends to continue to guide
his nation's progress, but he recognizes that his active
participation depends upon continued good health and vitali-
ty. He would like to see his son rule while he advised from
"retirement" ; the Shah responded to the question "How much
longer do you see yourself actively leading this country?"
as follows:
If I was not of the opinion and the belief that I should
let my son ascend to the throne and be there for a while,
I would have said until my natural death, and when that
will come, I connot say. How long will I remain alert
and in the full capacity of my brain and body, I cannot
tell. But I know that in about 13-14 years time the
foundation will be so firmly laid down that after that
I don't think any danger could threaten our country.
[93:14 Dec 74]
3 . To what extent does the actor believe he can predict
his political future?
Predictability of the future depends upon thoroughly
understanding the present and recognizing current trends.
The future of the industrialized states, with which Iran has
a close affinity, will be significantly dependent upon the
way those nations deal with the current pressing problems of
inflation and the extravagant use of raw materials. The Shah
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seemingly will do all he can, based on his perceptions of the
world economic situation, to encourage an expedient resolu-
tion of the present fiscal and monetary problems of developed
nations so that Iran won't "fall with the West." "The Monarch
stated in the interview [with Le Point ] that he could not
wish the destruction of the Western World because 'after all,
I belong to this world.' " [93:11 Jan 75] To this end, Iranian
oil will serve as a useful tool, and Iran will not join the
7Arab boycott schemes.
The long-range future is less predictable than the
short-range of five to ten years. However, the Shah appears
to believe the future is deterministic, and actors must recog-
nize their role in history and play it successfully. The Shah
does believe that he has been aided in life; "I am convinced
that I have been able to accomplish things which unaided by
some unseen hand, I could never have done. .. .Indeed, I should
consider it arrogant to believe that I could accomplish my
life-work without God's help." [67: 53]
4. How does the actor perceive his role in controlling
and shaping history?
This question is closely related to the preceding one.
The Shahanshah chose "Mission for My Country" as the title
of his autobiography; throughout the work he strongly sug-
gests that he has a significant role in shaping the history
of Iran. Whether called to his "mission" by God or by accept-
ing more responsibility for Iran's development as a result of
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reaching political maturity in the 1950' s, His Imperial
Majesty has demonstrated that one can indeed play a key role
in controlling development.
Mohammed Reza Shah's style of government also indi-
cates that he strongly believes that one can have great
"mastery" over historical development. The Shah is informed
and involved in all phases and levels of decision-making in
Iran, and it is his policies and decisions which are pre-
dominantly responsible for his country's course of action.
5. What effect does the actor attribute to "chance" in
9historical development ?
The policy of "positive nationalism" formulated by
the Shahanshah more than two decades ago describes both his
approach to his reign and his goal for his subjects. The Shah
defines this as follows: "Positive nationalism, as I conceive
it, implies a policy of maximum political and economic inde-
pendence consistant with the interests of one's country....
It means that we make any agreement which is in our own
interests, regardless of the wishes or policies of others....
We place no reliance on supine passive neutrality." [67:12 5]
As a result of this aggressive approach, one is prepared to
take advantage of "chances" or opportunities to act which
might otherwise go unnoticed.
"Chance" can also be an opportunity presented to one's
adversaries due to corruption and to negligence in carrying
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out one's duties. The others to be vigilant in the perform-
ance of their responsibilities and thus decrease the negative
effects of "change" on Iranian development.
C. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
1. What does the actor deem to be the "best approach"
for selecting political action objectives .
His Imperial Majesty can select political objectives
for four purposes. First are goals designed to dramatically
improve Iran as it continues its development under the Pahlavi
Dynasty; areas addressed include industrialization and self-
sufficiency. Second are those pursued to enhance Iran's
position in the international community; these include inter-
national trade, foreign policy objectives and national
security,, Third are goals which are to promote the welfare
and happiness of the Iranian people; these are socially
oriented such as education, health care, and rural develop-
ment. Lastly are goals of a large scale which make up a grand
program such as the "Great Civilization." This last type
includes elements of the first three sets, and while designed
to achieve a better lifestyle, the massive scope suggests
that realization of these goals is directly related to the
continuing reign of the monarch. Thus, this fourth class of
goals is designed to help maintain the Shah's power.
The "Great Civilization" is the objective of Iranian
policy today. Iran is still far from achieving the world
pre-eminence known by Persia under Darius and Cyrus during
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its first "Great Civilization." Petroleum resources are the
immediate key to the nation's development. However, the Shah
is well aware that this valuable resource is nonreplenishable
and hence potentially exhaustible. While in Australia the
Shah emphasized Iran's decision to use nuclear power to gener-
ate electricity saying, "We are the first to say that petrol-
eum and gas are too valuable commodities to be burnt, for
instance, for heating houses or making electricity." [93:5
Oct 74]
This constraint necessitates the adoption of short-
run goals which will be attainable using oil revenues and
will provide a basis for future development of a "post-oil"
economy. The monarch told a group studying problems of the
Shah-People Revolution, "Competent Iranian executives, backed
by popular participation in production, can keep the nation's
capital growing even after oil reserves are depleted." [93:11
May 74]
Concurrent with consideration of eventual depletion
of the source of oil revenue is concern for domestic stability
in order to provide a favorable climate for development.
Popular unrest and rioting in Iran may help a leader to take
a more active role in government such as resulted after the
"People's Uprising" of 28 Morbad 1332 (19 August 1953).
Since that time Mohammed Reza Shah has greatly expanded his
leadership role in Iran. However, such upheaval could just
as likely mark the end of another Persian dynasty.
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Thus, when selecting objectives the Shah must satis-
fy his subjects with goals designed to fulfill their desire
for education, medical care, good housing, and security. He
must also appeal to a sense of greater national goals which
will necessarily take a long time to meet and will also re-
quire sacrifices resulting from the allocation of scarce re-
sources, especially adequate trained-manpower reserves.
2 . How does the actor pursue his political objectives?
The answer to this is best expressed by the name given
to the reform movement originally termed the White Revolution:
12
"The Revolution of the Shah and the People." The method of
action adopted by the Shahanshah has been to form a link with
his subjects; his major goals are presented to the nation as
objectives common to the monarch and to the populace. During
his speech to the nation announcing the agreement giving the
National Iranian Oil Company complete control over the nation's
petroleum exploitation and distribution, the Shahanshah told
his people, "My strength derives only from your strength,
and your strength is the strength of the soliderity of the
Iranian nation that today commands respect in the world."
[93:4 Aug 73] In his Constitution Day speech the following
week he asserted, "The people's will is the dynamic drive be-
hind all the measures which have pushed the levels of welfare
and progress to staggering heights in Iran." [93:11 Aug 73]
This Shah-People bond helps the monarch to establish national
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priorities and -do administer the allocation of funds and re-
sources thus having direct control over the pace of fulfill-
ment of his goals.
A desire to integrate the concepts of democracy and
constructive political opposition has been part of the Shah's
stated objectives for some time. "In a democracy the people
must share in deciding their own destiny, and in most matters
the best way to choose the wise path is through public dis-
cussion and argument. I am happy to say that Persia's modern
parties are gradually setting aside our traditional weakness
of thinking in personality rather than policy terms." [67:172]
The monarch has encouraged a minority or opposition
party to function, until recently represented as the Mardom
13(People's Party). During an interview given to Nedaye
Iran-Novin
,
the newspaper of the majority Iran Novin (New
Iran) Party, the Shahanshah expressed support for a minority
party, but he also indicated that it should be limited in
scope:
We have said of political parties that since a one-party
system leads to dictatorship, naturally there must be
another party, at least one party and, possibly, if the
people desire and the need be felt, other organisations
can exist.
However, they will be of limited scope, since the vari-
ous analyses of the ideology of the Revolution of Shah
and the People, the extent of whose acceptance by the
Iranian people is known to all, cannot greatly differ
from one another. [93:23 Jun 733
The first week of March 1975 the Shahanshah announced
a marked departure from his support of a "two-party system":
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the merger of Iran's political organizations into a single
Iran Resurgence Party. He expressed his view of democracy
in his speech to the nation:
With all due respect to constitutionalism, or, as it is
termed in the West, democracy, I should point out that
the democracy we recognise is that in which the nation
somehow expresses its will. And once the will of the
majority is known, the minority will respect it as if
it were their own, even if they are half the population
minus only one. [93:3 Mar 75]
He observed that "playing the role of a loyal opposition is
very difficult in this country." To "straighten out Iranian
ranks" the Shah suggested "two categories: those who believe
in Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Sixth Bahman Revolu-
tion; and those who don't." [93:3 Mar 75]
The Shah forsees that "wings" of differing opinion
may form within the new party observing that this will pro-
vide the constructive criticism necessary for democracy. If
a person truly does not accept the three principles of the
new party he will enjoy freedom in Iran, provided that his
is not a traitor or a Communist who "belongs in an Iranian
prison" or should leave the country "because he is not an
Iranian." [93:3 Mar 75]
3 • How does the actor assess the "risks" of pursuing
political objectives ? '
Political action by the Shah can have two external
effects: action directed toward the Soviet Union, the United
States, or other major industrialized states may jeopardize
existing or pending trade agreements, or it may have grave
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security implications; action directed toward the Third
World states and the smaller industrialized nations either
enhance or diminish Iran's standing within the developing
community.
The first type of action requires firmness and de-
cisiveness on the part of the Shah. His developing nation,
despite its modern arsenal of advanced weaponry, is no match
for the super powers should an act lead to military confron-
tation. "The only country capable of landing troops in Iran,
the monarch noted [in a recent interview with Per Speigel ],
was the Soviet Union. Such an invasion, he stressed, would
meet die-hard solid resistance and whatever might fall into
the hands of the invaders would be turned into a heap of use-
less ashes.*' [93: 15 Feb 75] Iran does, however, have a
commodity of recognized wealth, petroleum; the resulting
Iranian capital is valuable to the East and to the West, with
both the Soviet Union and the United States anxious to main-
tain cordial commercial relations with Iran.
Actions of the second type are exemplified by foreign
trade with and aid to other nations, notably in the Middle
East, South Asia, and Africa. The Shah has done much to pro-
mote himself and his nation into a position of leadership in
the circle of developing states. Iran recently has pursued
trade and aid agreements with such states as Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka j Zaire, and Senegal.
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In addition to investing in German's Krupp Steel and
the United States' Pan Am World Airways, the Shah has advo-
cated joint investment ventures with such states as Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, Poland and Rumania. Iran's monarch dis-
misses charges of "economic imperialism; "because we do not
try to get majority shares or controlling shares where we
invest .. .this alone will be sufficient to show that we have
no such intentions." [93: 5 Oct 74]
Boldness and decisiveness are the keys to the Shah's
15political action. These two traits not only serve to pro-
mote an aggressive and vigorous image abroad for the develop-
ing nation, but when applied to domestic political action
they serve as indicators of the Shah's aggressive leadership
and his continued dominance of Iranian decision-making.
4. How does the actor "time" his political actions?
The Shahanshah must time his actions well to continue
the pace of domestic progress while actively pursuing the
development of Iran's international interests. To satisfy
the former requirements, the Shah uses a demanding series
of public appearances such as ceremonies marking the comple-
tion of public works or the opening of new or expanded factory
facilities, national conferences such as the recent 7th Annual
-i '
Ramsar Education Conference, and national holiday messages.
The Shah initiates international action as well as
responding to world event. He uses his state visits abroad
and those to Iran by foreign dignitaries as a means to regulate
3S

his "international timing." He has proven himself quite
able to meet with heads of state from both sides of the Iron
Curtain as well as with non-aligned actors. Remarks during
state banquets both in and out of Teheran and during press
conferences are the two primary methods that the Shah employs
to make public his foreign policy actions.
The Shahanshah's timing, then, must provide coordina-
tion for his domestic and foreign policy actions. To facili-
tate the boldness and decisiveness characteristic of the
present, this timing must be crisp. His Imperial Majesty
must vigorously pursue his domestic and foreign actions in
order to keep Iranian development at its present pace.
5 . Of what value are various methods of pursuing one's
objectives?
The Shah is keenly aware of his country's unique
position: as a developing nation Iran can be identified with
the Third World, but its close ties to the industrialized
states, through its substantial investments of petroleum
revenues and its continuing need for technical assistance,
allow Iran to freely associate with the industrialized na-
tions. As a result, His Imperial Majesty is able to make the
most of both affiliations: the former to actively participate
in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and to




Iran's monarch can use either affiliation to pursue
different goals; however, he refrains from making any moves
which would decisively place Iran in one camp or the other.
Instead, he allows himself the freedom to appear affiliated
in whichever direction is dictated by a given objective
while continuing to develop an Iranian national consciousness
based upon twenty-five centuries of Persian tradition. The
desired effect is that observers from industrialized nations
tend to view Iran as an emerging industrialized state while
those from developing countries view Iran as similar to their
17
states. This frees Iran to its independent national policy.
D. APPLICATION
Alexander George, in his article, cautions researchers
to "take note of the possibility that in some non-Western
cultures the problem of knowledge and its relation to the
calculation of political action may be approached different-
ly and, hence, the list of fundamental questions identified
here may not be entirely applicable." [l$l:200-0l] Mohammed
Reza Shah has a substantial Western orientation—his Swiss
education, his friendships with United States and Western
Europe, and his Western approach to modernization and indus-
trialization; however, the effect of the non-Western Iranian
culture is great upon the Shah's perceptions. George's ten
questions concerning philosophical and instrumental beliefs
provide a valid framework around which initially to develop
an "operational code" for Iran's monarch, but George's
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perceptive caution is quite applicable, especially when mov-
ing from the code to estimate the Shah's political behavior.
The answers given above to the ten questions attempt to
consider that the Shah definitely perceives himself as a
non-Western, traditional monarch working closely with his
1$people. In general, he views the political universe, in
which he rapidly is becoming a major actor, as one of tension
and conflict. A thorough understanding of the present par-
ticularly the current economic situation, and an aggressive
pursuit of one's national objectives aid greatly in predict-
ing and in shaping future events.
The climate of detente is helping to ease the tensions
of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the
Soviet Union. However, continuing conflict in the Middle
East, insurgent groups such as the Dhofar rebels in Oman, and
separatist movements in Pakistani Baluchestan all cause the
Shah to view his political climate as one of conflict.
Faced by a universe of conflict, His Imperial Majesty
projects an air of optimism; despite the widespread economic
uncertainty, Iran will continue to develop at a phenomenal
"40 percent" growth rate, [93: 6 Apr 74] so that perhaps
within a decade the "Great Civilization" envisioned by the
Shah, with its social reform and industrialization so advanced
that it will place Iran among the leading nations in the
world, may be realized. Iran once again will know the glory
known under Darius the Great centuries ago, and the Iranians
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will be able to view their long history without yearning for
past greatness. This is the essence of the Shah's perception
of his "mission."
The five answers offered to develop the more specific,
instrumental political beliefs indicate the the Shah uses a
bond between himself and his people as the most effective
method to approach his mission. Iran enjoys the ability to
identify with either the developing states or the industrial-
ized nations, and the monarch exploits this asset in foreign
affairs. His Imperial Majesty, however, clearly is pursuing
an independent policy designed to accomplish the enrichment
and modernization of his nation while avoiding the "pitfalls"
19
of Western democracy.
The above points are the result of applying the "opera-
tional code" approach to analyze information about the Shah's
political beliefs. The resulting "operational code" accord-
ing to Alexander George, is to be taken "as a set of premises
and beliefs about politics and not as a set of rules and
recipes to be applied mechanically to the choice of action."
[151:196-7]
The "operational code," while not the sole factor describ-
ing an actor's behavior, serves as a useful frame of reference
when analyzing the individual's political actions. Having
codified the Shahanshah's belief system using George's model,
the next phase of this project was to examine His Imperial
Majesty's political actions. The intent of the research
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resulting in the analyses in the following sections was to
avoid biases possibly present in foreign reports; without a
knowledge of Farsi on behalf of the researcher, the English-
language Iranian press was scrutinized. Daily editions of
the Tehran Journal and the Kayhan International were reviewed,
but the weekly airmail edition by Kayhan was finally selected
as a workable format to provide information between June 1973
and March 1975. Qualitative content analysis was used to
generally discern the Shah's political actions in light of
his "operational code."
The domestic Iranian political atmosphere is extremely
interesting, but proved so complex that it could not be ade-
quately covered in this research project. However, the Shah's
domestic image is a valuable complement to his international
image and for that reason was included in Section II below.
The Shahanshah's approach toward foreign affairs was
examined on three levels: local, regional and global. The
local aspect addressed those areas perceived by the Shah to be
immediately vital to his nation's security. Foremost is the
Persian Gulf, Iran's "lifeline," crucial as the waterway
facilitating transport of petroleum exports which finance
Iran's rapid development. Also important are Iran's rela-
tions with its land neighbors: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and the Soviet Union.
The regional foreign policy considerations of Iran center
around two main areas: the Middle East v/ith its Arab-Israeli
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situation and the Indian Ocean. The latter area is the focus
of a proposal by the Shah to create a "common market" of the
littoral states.
Iran's global considerations encompass its relations
with the industrialized nations on one hand and its relations
with the Third World states on the other. Attendant is the
Shah's leading role in the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries.
Sections III, IV, and V below deal respectively with
important aspects of the Shahanshan's local, regional, and
global political behavior based upon a qualitative analysis
of English-language Iranian sources utilizing the set of be-





For similar approaches see [43:359-65], [43:254] and
[31:45-51].
2
The questions which follow were derived from those posed
by Professor George [151:201 ff.J.
3For a discussion of conflict as it affects a decision-
maker see [33:43 ff
.
] and applied to the Shahanshah see
[12:144 ff.].
Refer to page 19 above.
5An acronym derived from Saz eman Etteloat va Amniyat
Keshvar. "National Security and~lnformation Organization"
L80:635J.
/
The "Great Civilization" is a collective term for Iran's
policy objectives in a wide range of reforms and advances;
Iranians will be able to enjoy the fruits of prosperity re-
sulting from present education; work, and participation in
fulfilling national goals. For cultured sources of the con-
cept see [Ref. 1$4].
7The Shahanshah has consistently avowed that Iran would
not join the Arab states' oil boycott; he would use oil as
a weapon,' he told the German magazine, Per Speigel, "only if
I were in a war myself, for my count ry.
-
" [93: l2~7Fan 74]
See [12:57 ff.].
See [l$4] for a discussion of "chance" in Islamic, tradi-
tion; refer also to [Si: 53-59] and [33:174 ff.] concerning
"chance" in political actions.
This theme recurs particularly in remarks made when
ministers present new members of their staffs. "Addressing
Interior Minister Jamshid Amugezar, who introduced five new
undersecretaries, the Shahanshah said that 'bullies and their
victims will invariably resort to corruption. If you elimin-
ate bullying, corruption will end.' " [93: 31 Aug 74]
Refer to chapter 5. "Revolution and Political Order,"
in [Ref. 46].
12See pp. 19-20 above. Also applicable is chapter 6, "Re-
form and Political Change," in [Ref. 46].
45

*0f the 263 Deputies elected in 1971 for the twenty-
third session of the Majlis, only thirty-six were from the
Mardom Party while 22$ represented Iran Novin, two seats
went to independent candidates while the remaining two were
vacant. Statistics from [65:310].
14See [48:242-44].
Refer to [15:135 ff . ] concerning Middle Eastern person-
ality traits and values.
For example see "Labour laws are a model for others"
[93: 26 Oct 74] or "A 21-vear leap from bankruptcy to af-
fluence" [93: 25 Aug 74]."
17Refer to [Refs. 12 and 17] concerning the Iranian deci-
sion-making process. Also see [75:79-$0] for "maxims for a
king."
1$
"The Shah, under the lav/, is a constitutional monarch
with powers in trust from the nation, vested by the people
and 'by the grace of God.' " [$0:250]. During his speech on
the twentieth anniversary of the 2$ Mordad Uprising "the
Shahanshah reiterated his faith in the bonds between the
monarch and the people and his determination to 'devote all
my life to the greatness of the country and the progress and
prosperity of the people. 1 " [93: 25 Aug 73]
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"We must vaccinate ourselves against the evils arising
from great material comfort and what is commonly known as
Western democracy. .. .We should master highly advanced Western
technology without falling a victim to the corruption and






Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi began his reign under most ad-
verse conditions. He had been carefully groomed for his role
by his energetic and aggressive father; however, when the
yong monarch rose to "power" in 1941, his function was little
more than decorative. The Shah's rise was rapid indeed; only
three years earlier he had completed his formal education at
the Military College of Teheran, graduating with the rank of
Second Lieutenant. One eventuality by which his father's
tutelage could not have adequately prepared Mohammed Reza Shah
was to deal effectively with occupying Allied powers.
After World War II the Shah endeavored to develop his
leadership role in Iranian decision-making, and seemingly
reached "political maturity" by successfully weathering the
tumultuous civil strife of the early 1950' s. , The post-war
attempts by the Soviet Union to gain dominance in the Iranian
province of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh Party's bid to dominate
Iranian politics, and Prime Minister Mossadegh's xenophobic
approach to the development of Iran's oil resources were all
2
major trials for the young monarch. His ability to utilize
foreign friendships (notably that of the United States) and
to maintain his domestic support (particularly that of the
army) enabled the Shah to consolidate his position of leader-
ship and to embark upon his ambitious reform programs.
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Today the fifty-four-year-old monarch is a distinguished
and politically mature statesman. Whether in Western business
suit or in impressive military uniform, His Imperial Majesty
projects an image of refinement and style befitting his posi-
tion of Shahanshah—King of Kings; the image fits a monarch
who is so intimately involved in his nation's remarkable
development
.
Western reporters once characterized the young Shah as
follows: "Like most Oriental princelings he has the reputa-
tion of liking females and a passion for driving his license-
less Bugatti as fast as it will go." [241:23-24] Now the
image portrayed by Western publications is more similar to
that of the head of a large corporate entity. The Shah's
image, however, is more complex in that he is the latest
monarch in a centuries-old tradition. Lavish ceremonials such
as His Imperial Majesty's coronation in 1967 and the twenty-
fifth centenary celebration at Persepolis in 1971 remind both
Iranians and foreigners of the symbolic importance and mag-
nificence of the Peacock Throne.
Modernization rather than exploitation has characterized
the present monarch's reign. As the second of the Pahlavi
line, the Shah would understandably criticise the preceeding
Qajar Dynasty. Although Iran was not subjected to European
colonization as were many of its Middle Eastern neighbors,
nineteenth century Persia was far from free to pursue poli-
cies independent of its European "friends": Britain, Russia,
and to a lesser extent Germany.
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As a result of recent past experience, one of His Imperi-
al Majesty's most important goals is national self-sufficiency,
During the Shah's public address on the sixty-eighth anni-
versary of Constitution Day he stated, "In the night of its
independent national policy, Iran now determines its own
destiny, has full sovereignty over its natural riches and has
surpassed all other nations in economic development." [93
10 Aug 74]
Domestic policy in Iran continues to focus on social re-
form and industrial development. While a student in
Switzerland Mohammed Reza Shah recalls, "I... began to think
about specific policies that I might adopt when I became king.
Already I had acquired a special concern for the peasants."
[67:62] His program to distribute Crown properties to the
Iranian peasantry was the first major attempt at land reform.
Following this were the ambitious programs of the White Revolu-
tion with education, medical care, and rural development being
three key areas of concern. The Shah's perception of his
mission will most likely cause him to continue his programs
of reform, expanding them to the full extent possible based
on Iran's expanding oil revenues.
The Shah's sense of his mission is also manifested by his.
regal style: displaying splendor befitting the lengthy Persian
kingship tradition and reflecting Iran's petroleum wealth
while continuing to be an active "working" monarch aggressive-
ly pursuing his nation's domestic and foreign policy goals.
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As he told the delegates to the August 1974 Fifth Plan revi-
sion conference,
The favourable circumstances we enjoy today only rarely
occur. Not every country in the world can count on hav-
ing them easily. Fortunately, these unique opportunities
are available to us today. It is a pity to let them slip.
The failure to seize them is not only a pity but an un-
forgivable sin. [93: 10 Aug 74]
Industrial development in Iran continues rapidly under
both private and governmental supervision. The huge capital
requirements of heavy industry have usually resulted in
government sponsorship and control. On "Oil Day," 9 Mordad
1352 (31 July 1973), the Shahanshah signed an agreement with
international oil companies participating in the exploitation
of Iranian reserves to give the state-owned National Iranian
Oil Company full control of Iran's oil assets; this made Iran
one of the first major OPEC nations to so act. [93: 4 Aug 73]
Steel making and mineral exploitation are also controlled by
the Iranian government. In many cases in which the govern-
ment originally owned and operated manufacturing plants,
workers are now permitted and encouraged to buy shares of
stock thus gaining the right to participate in the companies.
The Shahanshah told a study group concerned with problems of
the White Revolution that
Iranians must increasingly participate in national affairs
and shape their own destiny. The extent to which every
Iranian must participate has already been clarified.
People were offered 49 percent of private factories and
99 percent of state corporations. . .The one percent of
shares left from Government factory stocks, he added,
represented the right to management, which, he stressed,
had to be intrusted with especially trained executives
not those owning businesses. [93: 11 May 74]
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Heavy industries including petroleum, steel, and copper
"would remain nationalised" and therefore not open to worker
participation in shareholding.
B. THE PERSIAN GULF^
The traditional name of the strategic body of water
separating Iran and the Arabian Peninsula is the "Persian
Gulf." The Iranian monarch can see no basis for the Arab's
claim that the body should be termed anything else, especial-
ly the "Arabian Gulf." "To a suggestion [during a Kuwaiti
press interview] that Arab-Iranian relations could be im-
proved by renaming the Persian Gulf the Islamic Gulf instead
of Persian or Arabian as it is known from opposite sides the
Monarch said: 'You have no historical or geographical right
to say such a thing.' " [93: 11 Jan 75]
The Gulf has become a "superhighway" for huge vessels
laden with precious petroleum from the region and destined
for the world's markets. "The Persian Gulf, he [the Shah]
argued was Iran's lifeline; it must be kept open at all costs.
It was also the lifeline of Europe and the United States,
providing 60 percent of West European oil consumption." [93:
22 Sep 73] Security in the Persian Gulf accordingly receives
much attention in Iran.
The "jugular vein" of the "lifeline" is the Strait Hormoz
between Oman and Iran. The latter nation dominates the north-
ern shore of the narrow strait and also has assumed possession
of the small islands Abu Musa , Greater and Lesser Tumbs.
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[93: 12 May 73] The massive expansion program underway to
develop the Imperial Iranian Navy has as a premier objective
control and defense of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz
and the Indian Ocean shipping-lane approaches. "In building
up a strong navy, our aim has not been confined to leadership
in the Persian Gulf or Iran's territorial waters. . .because in
the world today, Iran enjoys a position which is giving its
duties regional dimensions, 'the Shahanshah pointed out dur-
ing ceremonies marking the 42nd anniversary of the establish-
ment of the Imperial Navy.' " [93: 9 Nov 74]
In November 1974 the "biggest manoeuvers of its 42-year-
old history" tested the defensive and offensive capabilities
of the Imperial Iranian Navy in this context. [93: 9 Nov 74]
Iran's forces have a professed defensive mission; they are
unquestionably well-equipped and capable of unilaterally
providing military security for the Gulf.
His Imperial Majesty has attempted to establish a securi-
5ty system for the Persian Gulf with participation by all
Gulf states, but response has been minimal. While emphasiz-
ing economic development in the area, Iran is ready to assist
any state in the region to maintain security and stability.
"His Imperial Majesty noted that welfare and justice would
make the environment unfavourable for the growth of subver-
sion." [93: 9 Mar 74]
Sultan Qabus ben Said of Oman has availed himself of this
offer resulting in an Iranian task force operating against
i>2

the communist-inspired rebels in Dhofar. The Shah views
this utilization of his troops as vital to keep a radical
regieme from gaining control of the Omani side of the Strait
of Hormuz and possibly disrupting the seaborne transport of
oil from the region. "The reason why we are helping Oman is
first that they asked for our help, secondly that it would
give them an opportunity to bring peace and security to their
country and thirdly that the f jugular of the Persian Gulf
which faces Bandar Abbas will be secure.' " [93: 11 Jan 75]
The Shahanshah would like the Persian Gulf to be a
"closed sea" with military defense a function of the littoral
states. He once told the London Times , "We would be willing,
in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, to provide protection for
the Persian Gulf states... We would like to see a common
defence policy established for the area. We would propose
that the Persian Gulf becomes a closed sea and that the port
of Bahrain be used as a joint naval base." [93: 14 Jan 69]
The oil resources of this area of the Middle East are
very valuable to all states therein. Included are the under-
water reserves in the Persian Gulf. In the interest of a
peaceful settlement of mineral claims by littoral states,
Iran has reached agreements for cooperation "to prevent the
illegal exploitation of sea food and facilitate the tapping
of seabed mineral deposits" in the Persian and Omani Gulfs




The Shah recognizes the tremendous importance of the
Persian Gulf to Iran. He recognizes the real potential for
conflict over resources and transit rights and optimistically
attempts to promote good relations with his Arab neighbors
across the Gulf. He seeks a peaceful solution to problems
which arise, but he also prepares for the event that Iran and
its neighbors disagree leading to combat in the Gulf. The
understanding and the cooperation existing between Iran and
its Arab neighbors across the Gulf imply that the most immedi-
ate threat to Iran's security in the area from radical groups
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian
Gulf (PFLOAG) operating from the People's Republic of Yemen.
Kayhan International reports,
The Shahanshah has said that Iran will stamp out terror-
ists threatening the Strait of Hormoz even if the Persian
Gulf countries from which they operate do not consent to
Iran's intervention.
.. [but] Iran would prefer to do so at
the terroist-infested countries' request. But he stressed,
Iran could not afford to sit idle when its lifeline, the
Strait of Hormoz, was threatened by closure. [93: 4 May 74 J
Expressing a Persian Gulf "domino theory" the Shah told the
Kuwaiti press "that if Oman falls into the hands of those
whose policies are opposed to the existing regimes of this
region, all the regional countries, including Kuwait, would
be in danger." [93: 11 Jan 75]
The marked exception to Iran's generally favorable rela-
tions with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf is Iraq. Premier
Hoveyda has stated "that cooperation and understanding
characterized Iran's relations with all states, except Iraq."
[93: 7 Dec 74]
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C. IRAN'S LAND NEIGHBORS
1. Iraq
The boundary between Iran and its Arab neighbor to
the west, Iraq, is disputed by both states. Navigation rights
on the Shatt-al-Arab River, the southern portion of the bound-
ary, are one area of contention. The huge Iranian oil re-
finery at Abadan, near the river, is quite vulnerable to at-
tack or sabotage operations from Iraq. Consequently, Iranian
forces are vigilant; Imperial Iranian Navy hovercraft stand
ready to operate in the area, and Iran's border troops are
in a high state of readiness along the land portion of the
frontier.
The United Nations has refused to hold debate on
Iraq's internal problem with Kurdish separatists in the north-
east, and Ba'athist government forces have recently mounted
7another military campaign against the Kurds, Iraq claims
that the Kurdish troops have received military supplies from
Iran while Iranian reports such as "Iran gives refuge to
70,000 Kurds" [93: 31 Aug 74] highlight the plight of Kurdish
refugees who have been able to reach Iran.
Stories of Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds and
Iraqi attacks on Iranian border outposts and villages enable
the Iranian press to portray Iraq in the obvious role of the
villain threatening to undo all the work of the Shahanshah
directed toward peace and stability in the area.
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The differences between Iran and Iraq are much more
basic than concern for Kurdish tribesmen. Fundamental ethnic,
religious, and political differences underlie the continuing
9
uneasy situation. Iran is a conservative monarchy adhering
to the Shi' a sect of Islam. Iraq is an Arab state controlled
by a radical Ba'ath-Socialist regime; its last monarch was de-
posed in a 195$ coup d' etat . Iraqis are predominately Sunni
Muslims.
The Shah would prefer to settle the border disputes
peacefully. He referred to his views of Iraq during a Kremlin
dinner speech while in the Soviet capital during November 1974:
"I just think that if Iraq followed the policy you [the Soviet
Union J did, as a much greater neighbour, in settling your
border disputes with us, and did not consider itself heir to
British colonialism, there would remain no problems between
Tehran and Baghdad." [93: 30 Nov 74]
One justification offered by the Shah for his purchase
of sophisticated weaponry, such as American F-14 aircraft, is
the large inventory of Iraq. The latter has received sub-
stantial military aid from the Soviet Union, and according
to the Shah's figures, "they have more tanks than we have,
with less than one-third of our population. . .they have more
planes... Mi G-2l...the TU-22 bomber. . .one squadron of SU-20
...Frog ground-to-ground missies. .. [and] the latest radar,
like the P-41." [93: 6 Apr 74]
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His Imperial Majesty must continue to be wary of his
Arab neighbor to the west. Recent press coverage of the
March 1975 Algiers meeting of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries highlighted an improvement in Irano-
Iraqi relations. The Iranian press reported, "President
Boumedierme [of Algeria] announced the reconciliation plan at
the closing session of the OPEC summit conference to the
vigorous cheers of the delegates. The Shahanshah and Saddam
Hussein left their seats and walked together to the rostrum
where they embraced Boumedienne amid rousing standing ovation
in the hall." [93: 15 Mar 75] Whether this is a result of
the Shah's continued efforts for peace or is an Iraqi effort
to mend its "back fence" in preparation for a renewal of
hostilities with Israel remains to be determined.
2. Pakistan
A major security concern of the Shah is his neighbor
to the east, Pakistan. His biggest fear is that a separatist
movement in Pakistani Baluchestan might "spill over" into
southeastern Iran. The recent war resulting in Bangladesh's
independence from Pakistan and the latter' s conflicts with
India make the future territorial integrity of Iran's neigh-
bor uncertain. In June 1973 the Shah stated that " Iran can-
not be, an observer to the disintegration of Pakistan.' He
said another blow against Pakistan's territorial integrity
would be contrary to Iran's national interests and well-being."
[93: 23 Jun 73]
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His Imperial Majesty is committed to assisting Pakistan
to recover from the wounds of war and also from the recent,
devastating earthquake. Iran loaned the country 5^0 million
dollars in 1974 [93: 27 Jul 74] and after the January 1975
earthquake donated one million dollars to the relief fund.
The Shah perceptively considers the stability of the Indian
subcontinent to be in Iran's best interests. Therefore, he
has stated that peace between India and Pakistan is a "cardin-
al policy" in Iran's foreign affairs. [94: 31 Oct 74] To
counter India's concern about Iranian military aid to Pakistan,
the Shah has stated that "we are not encouraging Pakistan to
adopt an aggressive, hostile attitude towards India. On the
contrary, we would like these two countries to be friends, to
cooperate." [93: 4 Aug 74]
One of the Shah's foreign policy objectives is to
create a "zone of stability" in South Asia with particular
attention to Pakistan. This has become part of a larger ob-
jective: an Indian Ocean "common market" organization to be
discussed in Section IV below.
3. Afghanistan
Iran's landlocked neighbor to the northeast,
Afghanistan, is not as significant to Iran's security con-
siderations as are the latter nation's three other "land
neighbors,"; however, the Shah is concerned about developments
in Kabul. Most significant to consider is Afghanistan's af-
finity toward the Soviet Union. The Shah does not view the
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recent change in Afghanistan's government as altering its
relations with Iran. "What is important for us is to have a
strong, independent and progressive Afghanistan, that's all."
[93: 14 Dec 74]
The Iranian monarch would like to aid Afghanistan's
economic development and has been trying to tie the two states
more closely together with road and rail systems. The Shah
invisions eventual commercial lines of communication through
Afghanistan to Asia and the .Soviet Union. [93: 6 Apr 74]
Economic development and political stability in
Afghanistan would not only help fulfill the Shahanshah's
goal of regional development, but it would also help tie
Kabul much closer to Teheran. Afghanistan might thus become
a more stable and reliable element in the Shah's security and
economic considerations.
4 . Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Iran's relations with its northern neighbor have not
always been as cordial as they are today. Czar Peter the
Great advocated Russian expansion southward to the "warm
water" of the Persian Gulf. The weak status of Iranian
politics in the nineteenth century enabled Russia to gain
territory once part of northwestern Persia. Russia partici-
pated with Britain effectively to divide Persia into spheres
of influence in 1907.
Soviet Russia first disavowed all Czarist dealings,
but then the Soviets proceeded to follow foreign policy toward
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Iran similar to that of Czars. Reza Shah's rise to power in
the 1920' s strengthened his country's ability to deal more
effectively in international relations, but the pressures and
opportunities of World War II were too great for the Soviets
to withstand. The Red Army was quite ready to move into Iran
12
with the British in 1941.
The post-war situation presented a grant opportunity
for the Soviets, with troops remaining in northern Iran, to
extend control over at least a part of the country. This re-
sulted in the Tudeh Party movement to "liberate" the province
13
of Azerbaijan in norther Iran.
His Imperial Majesty is strongly opposed to Communism;
he has banned it in Iran and he actively seeks to thwart its
spread in the Persian Gulf. As an expression of his independ-
ent policy the Shah has referred to the Iranian situation as
follows: "Our social system is neither Communist nor
Capitalist, it is a mixture of individual freedom and the re-
sponsibility an individual has toward society." [93: 22 Sep
73] His nearly-fatal struggle with Communist-inspired ele-
ments in Iran two decades ago has undoubtedly done much to
sustain the Shah's anti-Communist sentiments.
Iran's monarch has shown a remarkable ability to
actively develop his nation while maintaining amicable rela-
tions with Soviet Union. Undoubtedly Moscow would much rather
have a militarily weak neighbor to the south and would much
prefer the backward, underdeveloped Iranian economic situation
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of twenty years ago to the vigorously expanding Iran of today.
Iran's long common boundary with the Soviet Union makes co-
operation imperative for the former's survival, notwithstand-
ing the state of relations which had existed until after World
War II. The Shah recognizes this important aspect of his
foreign policy considerations as evidenced by a press report
following the leader's 1974 visit to Moscow: "The Shahanshah
said this week that the extensive and varied relations between
Iran and the Soviet Union showed Iran's success in promoting
international understanding and cooperation." [93: 2 Nov 74]
The Shah is proud of Iran's economic ties with the
Soviet Union. They complement the diplomatic relations be-
tween the two states and allow Iran to develop markets grant-
ing greater independence from the United States and Western
Europe. A major Irano-Soviet agreement in 1966 resulted in
Iranian natural gas being pumped north in exchange for a
Soviet-built steel mill at Isfahan.
The price at which the Soviets would purchase gas
was the subject of much Iranian press commentary during the
summer of 1974. Iranian articles ranged from "Moscow Re-
sponse on Gas Awaited" [93: 13 Jul 74] to "Russia Getting
Iran's Gas on the Cheap." [93: 1 Jun 74] Controversy stemmed
from a "price escalation formula" which was part of the
original treaty but had not resulted in a higher gas price
called for by increasing petroleum prices. "According to
the clause, the price of gas is pegged to that of light
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diesel oil sold at Bandar Mahshahr. The gas price is auto-
matically readjusted in direct proportion with changes from
10 to 30 per cent in diesel oil rates, the proportion being
one third of the change in price. ...For changes higher than
30 per cent, the two sides must negotiate an increase in the
gas price." [93: 24 Aug 74]
Noticeable during the period prior to the eventual
agreement on a new gas price was that the Shah refrained from
making references to the dispute. This most likely was in
the interest of preserving his relationship with the Kremlin
leadership. Following the early August agreement to increase
the price from thirty to fifty-seven cents per thousand cubic
feet, Farrokh Ebrahimi authored an article titled "Iran
Scores a Quiet But Great Victory of Gas." In the article he
states, "The credit for the success of the gas negotiations
went undoubtedly to the Shahanshah who had set the guidelines
for Iran' s negotiating team to safeguard the best interests
of the nation." [93: 31 Aug 74]
Mohammed Reza Shah is well aware that his nation is
far from able to successfully challenge the Soviet Union
militarily. Should a situation occur like the 1941 Allied
occupation, the Shah has called upon his people for an all-
out struggle noting "that the 1941 invasion probably would
not have taken place if the aggressors knew that they would
never capture the country intact even if they could overpower
the armed forces." [93: 9 Nov 74]
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The present peaceful situation indicated that the
Shah will likely continue his active stand against the
proliferation of Communism into the Middle East (particularly
into Iran) while striving to maintain his cordial relations
with the Soviet Union. A result of the Shah's two-day visit
to Moscow in November 1974 was that "Iran and the Soviet
Union have agreed in principle to expand their economic,







'See [Refs. 12 and 67].
ff.].
Refer to [67: $2 ff.]; for a second viewpoint, see [6:391
3See page 9.
See [Ref. 72] for a detailed analysis of Iranian inter-
ests in the Persian Gulf.
5Robert Jervis defines a "security area" as the area in
which whatever happened concerned the security interest of
the nation in question." [45:245]
/:
For background information see "Dead-end for Dhofar Re-
bels" [93: 8 Feb 75].
7See [Ref. 7].
For example, "Why Iran must defend itself" accompanies
"Pictures that tell the tale of Iraqi atrocities" with "approp-
riate" photos capticnal, "This WAS a man. . .and this WAS a
home /;/ This IS an Iraqi bomb." [93: 28 Dec 74]; also "IRAQI
CRUELTY CITED BY IRAN: Iranian nationals ousted through mine-
fields" (also with photos).
See [Refs. 16 and 69] and particularly for the Shi'
a
Sunni split [88 and 184].
10Refer to the "Celebrated will of Peter the Great"
quoted in [18:63], "And in the decadence of Persia, penetrate
as far as the Persian Gulf," etc.
1:LSee [Refs, 18 and 22],
12
For a contemporary account see [6:279 ff.].
13See [6:343 ff.] and [67:114 ff.].
The Shahanshah narrowly escaped death at the hands of





Iran is a major non-Semitic nation in the Middle East a-
long with Turkey. During its long history the "Land of the
Aryans" has both dominated and been dominated by the politics
of the region. The ancient empire of Darius the Great spanned
most of the Middle East sharing a frontier with Greece in Asia
Minor and with spreading along the Mediterranean coast to what
is now Lybia. Later, in the sixth century A.D., Persia was
engulfed by Islam spreading from the Arabian Peninsula.
Doctrinal splits developed in the "sphere of Islam" with
the passage of time, and today the Shi' a sect predominates in
Iran while most Arab believers are Sunni Muslims. The
Shahanshah has a strong belief in God and affirms in his auto-
biography, "I am convinced that I have been able to accomplish
things which, unaided by some unseen hand, I could never have
done." [67: 5#]
A major objective of the Shah's policy in the Middle East
2is Islamic unity. This is a recurring theme and transcends
the Shi'a-Sunni split. In remarks during a 1974 visit to Iran
by the President of the Sudan, the Shahanshah noted that "only
in unity can the Islamic World regain the material and spiritu-
al glory of its past." [93: 2 Mar 74] In remarks to Islamic
diplomats during Salam ceremonies at the end of Ramazan last
year, "the Shahanshah reiterated his view that only through
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unity could the Islamic countries safeguard their independ-
ence and sovereignty and help establish justice and spiritual
integrity in the world." [93: 26 Oct 74] Anwar al-Sadat ob-
served that "Iran with its faith in Islam is of necessity a
powerful champion of the Arab nations." [93: 11 Jan 74]
The theme of Muslim unity provides a common focus for the
regional policy of Iran and its Arab neighbors. It serves to
supersede the rivalry caused by the different ethnic back-
grounds of Iran and the Arab states across the Persian Gulf;
it encourages regional cooperation; and it facilitates the
cooperation of states with different socio-political systems
in the region.
Iran generally enjoys friendly relations with the Arab
nations of the Middle East. Iraq, the notable exception, may
3
even be moving toward more amiable ties with Iran. During
January 1975 Mohammed Reza Shah and Empress Farah visited King
Husayn in Jordan for three days and then made a four-day visit
to the Egyptian Arab Republic (E.A.R.).
The two visits were significant indicators of the Shah's
interest in his Arab neighbors. Iran is using its increased
petroleum revenues to finance aid to developing nations, and
both Jordan and the E.A.R. benefited from the Shah's visits.-
The trip to Amman, the first since 1959, coincided with agree-
ments for "an interest-free $10 million loan to finance a
housing project for Jordanian Army officers" and a grant for
"a $500,000 medical and vocational rehabilitation centre."
[93: 11 Jan 74]
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The Tehran Journal reported five Irano-Egyptian trade
agreements in its 27 November 1974 edition announcing the
following joint ventures: a fertilizer plant, a cotton
spinning factory, an investment bank, engineering and con-
struction companies for work in Port Said, and a Suez City-
Port Said pipeline to be completed by the National Iranian
Oil Company.
The Shahanshah continues to pursue independent policies
in the Middle East. His close friendship with the Arab states
does not prevent him from dealing with Israel. While the
Shah strongly believes that Israel should withdraw from oc-
cupied Arab territory as a move toward peace and stability in
the region, he also recognizes Israel's right to survive as a
nation recognized by the United Nations* "'The whole thing
is based on the unacceptable situation of the occupation of
the land of Arabs by Israel. On the other hand there must
be some gesture towards the State of Israel which has been
recognized as a member of the United Nations.' " [93: 28 Dec 74]
Arab states in the Middle East receive encouragement and
aid from Iran to assist their efforts to regain lost terri-
tory. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli fighting "Iran
put a number of Iranian aircraft at the disposal of Saudi
Arabia." The Shah stated, "'These aircraft did what was re-
quired of them. ' " However, the Shah resents his Arab neigh-
bors' charges that Iran should stop dealing with Israel. He
remarked in the same interview with the Beirut paper,
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al-Hawadis , "that there was 'no contradiction 1 between Iran's
support for the Arabs and its economic relations with Israel."
[93: 1 Dec 74]
The sale of petroleum to Israel is an economic rather
than political action by Iran. The Shah has stated, "Once
the tankers are loaded, we do not mind where it goes... .For
us this is purely a commercial transaction." [93: 22 Feb 75]
During his recent winter holiday near Zurich the Shah granted
C.B.S. an interview during which "the Monarch said Iran was
not 'the godfather of Israel' " in response to a question ask-
ing if Iran was going to insure oil for Israel if the latter
withdrew from the Abu Rudeiss oilfield in the Sinai. "The
Monarch said Israel would not be denied of oil. 'All the oil
companies could sell oil to Israel*.. She will probably have
to pay for it, that's all." [93: 15 Feb 75]
His Imperial Majesty views stability and development to
be central goals for the Middle East as in other regions of
the world. Stability, so essential for continuing develop-
ment, will not characterize the Middle East until the Arab-
Israeli conflict is resolved. The Shah's objectives for
settlement are the following: implementation of United Na-
tions Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 calling for Israeli
withdrawal from all occupied territory, restoration of rights
of self-determination for Palestinians, prevention of any
unilateral change in the status of Arab Jerusalem, resumption
of the Geneva negotiations with the Palestine Liberation
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Organization participating in behalf of the Palestinians, and
abrogation of all military agreements with power outside the
Middle East. 24"
The week prior to the monarch's January visit to Amman
and Cairo he reasserted that Iran would not participate mili-
tarily in any renewal of the Arab-Israeli fighting. A Kayhan
report states, "'There is no question, of course, of Iran
participating in the fighting, ' the Monarch said in an inter-
view published by the Egyptian daily al-Ahram . 'You know there
are geographical and other obstacles. But our sympathies will
definitely be with you.'" [93: 4 Jan 75]
"Other obstacles," while unspecified, would probably in-
clude the fact that the basis of the conflict is "Arab" ver-
sus "Israeli" and as the Shah notes, "It is very, very
strange: The Jews are Semites and the Arabs are Semites, too*"
[93: 12 Jan 74-] Sustaining possibly heavy losses of arms and
men in an Arab-Israeli conflict would hinder the realization
of the Shah's effort to build a strong, well-equipped force
able to defend the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, thus
enabling Iran credibly to challenge the rationale for the
major powers' presence in those seas.
Iran's support for the Palestinians reflects the decision
of the Islamic Summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, last year.
United Nations Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda , according to a
Teheran Journal report, voiced Iranian support for an independ-
ent Palestinian state saying that "the General Assembly could
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do no less" after the Summit. [94: 20 Nov 74] Yassir Arafat,
interviewed by the National Iranian Radio and Television,
"said the Shahanshah's statement that in a new Arab-Israeli
war Iran would sympathize with the Arabs had greatly touched
his heart." Arafat drew a parallel between Iran and
Palestine; "'Iran and ourselves created a great civilisation
during the Abbasid period together. A civilisation with
humanitarian roots, spread all over the world.'" [93: 11 Jan
75]
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (common-
ly termed "OPEC") is one vehicle through which Iran is able
to work with many of its Arab neighbors in the Middle East.
While Iran's position as the second largest exporter makes
Iranian actions significant, the Shah characterizes his nation
as "one of the more moderate members" of OPEC. He views the
biggest difference between his oil company and that of his
Arab neighbors to be that while they wish to use petroleum
as an offensive weapon in their struggle with Israel, Iranian
oil will be used to further the country's development.
His Imperial Majesty chooses to refer to Iran's oil as
"noble product." As he informed delegates to the 1974 Ramsar
Conference to revise the Fifth Development Plan, "The oil we
call the noble product will be depleted one day. It is a
shame to burn the noble product for the production of energy
to run factories and light houses. About 70,000 products can
be derived from oil." [93: 10 Aug 74]
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The National Iranian Oil Company (N.O.I.C.) gained com-
plete control of the nation's petroleum resources on "Oil
Day," 9 Mordad 1352 (31 July 1973 ). 5 Since that time the
Shah has been working to establish a "just price" for oil
from the Persian Gulf. He would like very much to do away
with the present, confusing system with posted and market
prices in favor of a single price depending only on quality
and location. He advocates determining this price as the
cost of developing and using alternative sources of energy
such as coal liquification, tar sands, shale oil, and nuclear
energy. [93: 29 Dec 73]
A further suggestion is to link the price of oil to a
"basket of 20 to 30 commodities" so that as the price of goods
used by oil exporting countries increased or decreased, the
price charged for their oil would change accordingly. [93:
9 Nov 74] This is an attempt to keep the West's rampant in-
flation from completely destroying the purchasing power of
the exporting nations since the latter usually rely on the
industrialized states for many goods.
A regional goal in addition to settlement of the Arab-
Israeli situation in the Middle East is to make it a "nuclear-
free zone." Iran intends to utilize nuclear power to gener-
ate electricity, purchasing reactors from both France and the
United States, but the Shah is strongly against his nation
acquiring nuclear weapons. "However, if every little country
obtained a few atomic bombs, then Iran would be forced to
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reconsider its position." [93: 15 Feb 75] To dissuade nations
from forming nuclear arsenals, Iran proposed the establish-
ment of a nuclear-free zone to the United Nations.
Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, made the presen-
tation to the United Nations in October 1974> while heading
Iran's General Assembly delegation. The Princess "called for
the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the
Middle East backed by an adequate system of guarantees." [93:
2 Nov 74] The EAR subsequently co-sponsored the measure, and
with "a vote of 12 £-0 with Israel and Burma abstaining, the
UN General Assembly this week commended Iran and Egypt's idea
of establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East and called for countries there to promise now not to
make or acquire nuclear weapons." [93: 14 Dec 74]
B. INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH ASIA
Iranian naval security is most readily associated with
the Persian Gulf. This is because of the extreme importance
of the Gulf to the Iranian oil industry. Iran is definitely
a dominant factor in the Gulf and has built its naval forces
with security of that important waterway in mind. However,
the Shahanshah is well aware that his security considerations
do not end at the Strait of Hormoz but continue to the Gulf
of Oman and into the Indian Ocean. In a Kayhan International
report, "The monarch said that 'we have no reason to be
ashamed of our (military) [sic] presence in the Indian Ocean.
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We have our own rights to the Ocean, certainly more than any-
foreign power does?'" [93: 4 May 74]
The European colonial utilized naval and marine forces
to guard and to protect their overseas empires. Britain,
during the height of its power, dominated vast areas of the
Indian Ocean to protect its ships engaging in commerce with
India, Singapore and the other colonies in the region. The
Royal Navy was the dominant force in the Persian Gulf while
Iraq was a British Mandate and the shaykhs of the Trucial
Coast enjoyed British protection.
Independence movements after the Second World War and
the enormous financial burden of administering the vast
British Empire both contributed to the disintegration of the
once mighty colonial system. Eventually London made the deci-
sion to withdraw its forces from the Indian Ocean including
the Persian Gulf in 1971. The Shah was very concerned that
the Soviet Union and the United States would quickly act to
fill the "power vacuum" created by the British withdrawal.
His Imperial Majesty envisioned a regional security plan
for the Persian Gulf in 1969 he called for "a defensive alli-
ance with all the states of the region to ensure its stabili-
ty after the British military withdrawal in 1971." [93*. 14
Jun 69]
Eventually the concept was enlarged to take in the entire
Indian Ocean and was presented during a five-nation tour in
7the region. Basically, the proposal is for the South Asian
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littoral states to unite in a military and eventually an
economic union similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and the European Economic Community. The major objec-
tive is for the states of the region to provide the security
necessary for the valuable shipping in the Indian Ocean, and
thereby powers outside the area would have no reason to main-
tain naval forces there. The Shah would like the Indian
Ocean, like the Middle East, to be a "zone of peace." [93: 5
Oct 74]
Such a security arrangement would greatly benefit Iran.
With the great wealth from oil, the country is in a good
financial position to develop the naval, ground, and air
forces necessary to help insure the region's peace; the abili-
ty to pay "cash" for military equipment frees Iran from many
of the "strings" so often attached to aid programs. If the
Iranian proposal is effective in forestalling a large naval
buildup in the region by the Soviet Union and the United
States, then Iran will be in a good position, because of its
military forces, to dictate policies for the region.
The Shahanshah outlined his proposal for an "Indian Ocean
Common Market" during remarks to the National Press Club in
Canberra, Australia. [93: 5 Oct 74] During the following
stop in New Zealand the monarch stated that although the is-
land nation was actually outside the Indian Ocean, there was
ample reason why "morally you can build it [the proposed sys-
tem] up; economically, you can join, if not entirely but
in some of its aspects." [93: 5 Oct 74]
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Australia and New Zealand would like to expand economic
relations with Iran as the latter is able to offer attrac-
tive agreements involving petroleum. The Shah, careful to
avoid the criticism of "economic imperialism," promoted his
policy of establishing joint ventures in overseas investments
rather than using Iranian capital to establish Iranian busi-
ness ventures abroad. In conjunction with the royal visit,
Iran concluded trade agreements with each nation. [93: 5
Oct 74]
Associated with the proposal and consistent with Mohammed
Reza Shah's policies is a move to create a nuclear-free zone
in the Indian Ocean. The Shah prefers to invest his military
budget for conventional equipment and use nuclear energy only
as a replacement for petroleum. He expresses no desire to
equip Iran with nuclear weapons and thereby increase the risk
of devastating nuclear exchange. He reportedly told Le Monde
,
"An atomic arms race in the region. . .was pointless. 'What is
to be done with these weapons? Do they want to use them
against the big powers? Do we want to commit suicide with
them?'" [93: 29 Jun 74]
Iran advocates a military cooperation agreement, but the
economic impact of greater regional interaction and interde-
pendence greatly interests the Shah. Much of Iran's develop-
ment results from exchanging petroleum for Western technology.
As Iran builds its industrial base, the monarch is seeking to
expand Iran's export markets and to reduce his nation's
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dependence on the West. The Shahanshah expressed his nation-
al policy objectives while greeting President Georges
Pompidou in Tehran,
The similar [to that of France] policy of national in-
depence we have adopted permits us to be masters of
our own destiny: to ensure the defence of our terri-
tory, to be masters of our wealth, to develop our
economy and to choose the path most appropriate to
our national interest. [93: 22 Sep 73 J
Iran is investing a great deal in nations of South Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa. Aid to developing nations greatly
enhances Iran' s world standing and can promote international
friendships. However, it can also lead to charges of "econ-
omic imperialism" and turn aid recipients against the donor
as the former become more self-sufficient. For this, Iran
would much prefer to pursue a policy of international trade
than one of foreign aid. Joint Iranian ventures in host
countries stimulate the economic development of both parties
and will probably have much more positive long-range policy
implications for the economic "allies" than will a foreign
aid policy.
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, French mili-
tary forces at the Comoro Islands off East Africa, and United
States' naval activity at Diego Garcia and by carrier task
forces concern Iran and all Indian Ocean states. This "Big
Power" incursion with the accompanying ominous implications
of foreign intervention in regional affairs is the object of
the Shah's proposal for a "zone of peace and prosperity" in
the Indian Ocean. Iran's monarch realizes that a viable
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regional military and economic union will take a long time
to evolve, and until such time he welcomes American presence
to offset that of the Soviet Union.
The Shah has stated that "we have the presence of Soviet
Union warships in the Indian Ocean, I don't see why one na-
tion could be represented so forcefully and not another."
[93: 9 Nov 74] A later report notes, "On the U. S. naval
base at Diego Garcia, the monarch said Iran's long-standing
policy favoured withdrawal of all 'outside powers' from the
Indian Ocean. But as long as some powers are there we will
not only not object, but we will welcome the U.S. presence
there.'" [93: 22 Feb 75]
Should an Indian Ocean "common market" develop, the Shah
would be quite interested to promote the development of road
and rail routes to more closely tie the states of the region
economically. Iran is now actively supporting an admittedly
awesome undertaking, but the Shahanshah most probably is al-
ready planning for his nation to transition from advocate to
architect, financier, and contractor. This would surely
benefit Iran and correspond with the Shah's projection, "If
everything went according to plan, Iran would in a decade,
catch up with European countries; in 2 5 [years] it would rank




1See [Refs. 33, 39, and 184].
2
For a chronology of Islamic Summits and the Saudi pro-
posal for an Islamic Pact see [79:109 ff.].
3See Section III.B.l above.
The Shah has stated these objections several times; see,
for example [93: 1 Dec 73, and 93: 11 Jan 75].
5The oil industry was nationalized in 1951 with the
National Iranian Oil Company replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company; however, the international oil companies still con-
trolled the marketing. Now Iran is able to "sell to Western
oil companies. . .market independently or consume locally...
without any foreign interference." [93: 4 Aug 73]
6See [Ref. 22].
7The proposal was presented during an October 1974 series





A. THE "THIRD WORLD"
Iran is a rapidly developing nation; the economy is ex-
panding at a tremendous rate, social reform is proceeding
with similar speed, and what even recently was a backward,
struggling state supplying the West with inexpensive petrole-
um is fast becoming one of the more significant actors in the
modern world. Iran was not a colony of the western powers
as were so many of the areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America that now are loosely grouped into the "Third World"
;
however, Iran's experiences, even only in this century, with
European intervention, occupation, and domestic domination
are quite analogous to the colonial experiences of other
Third World states.
The present situation in Iran both supports and denies
classification of the Middle Eastern state in the Third World.
Supportive points are that Iran is an emerging, developing
state; it has struggled with foreign powers for control of its
natural resources, only recently gaining full control of its
petroleum reserves; the nation's foreign policy goals are
similar to those of other Third World states in that Iran
wishes to be able to deal effectively with both the Free
World and with the Communist Bloc with the ability to pursue
national objectives independently from either major alignment.
The negative aspects of grouping Iran with the Third World
include the following: Iran is closely linked with the United
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States for military equipment support, for technological and
educational assistance, and for protection against aggres-
sion by the Soviet Union. Iran's rapid development, its
emergence as an industrialized state, and its military capa-
bility elevates the nation from the "rank and file" of the
Third V/orld to a prominent leader and possibly indicate that
Iran will attempt to take its place with the major powers of
the world, even forming its own "bloc."
Iran is not the only oil exporting nation to enjoy great-
ly increased profits from the exploitation of its valuable
reserves; rather, higher international prices for oil have
generally benefited all exporters. The major difference with
Iran is that the National Iranian Oil Company controls the
petroleum industry compared with other producing countries
which still are in "partnership" with multinational oil com-
panies.
The Shahanshah is providing leadership to other exporting
countries by proposing a single price system for oil. He
supported his position at a press conference for American
newsmen accompanying Secretary of State Kissinger to Iran in
1974 saying,
I think that a fixed price for oil has the advantage that
nobody could manipulate it further. I mean, everybody
will know that there is one single price for oil and how
much profits the oil companies should make on a barrel
of oil and how much it will cost the consumer to use and
to consume that oil and how much he is going to pay his
own country in taxation. [93: 9 Nov 74]
SO

A report in the Tehran Journal states of the plan, "Iran's
scheme, backed by an expert level working group from all OPEC
nations in October [1974] > would abolish the current two-tier
pricing system for oil, which puts OPEC governments at a dis-
advantage to the big mulinational oil companies." [94: 2$
Nov 74]
His Imperial Majesty referred to his nation's leading
role in OPEC in his 1974 Oil Day address:
The assumption by the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries of the unqualified right to determine
posted prices for oil under Iran's leadership is among
the most important objectives ever achieved throughout
world oil history. This achievement not only vastly
increased our oil revenues, but also firmly entrenched
our sovereignty over our petroleum reserves. [93: 3 Aug
74]
The rapid economic growth in Iran makes the country quite
noticeable in the modern world generally suffering from infla-
tion and talks of recession. Iran is not physically expand-
ing its empire as was the Persia of twenty-five centuries
ago, but it is extending its economic influence throughout
the world. The nation is proud of the attention received from
the United Nations concerning Iranian foreign aid; however,
the monarch is deeply concerned that the effects of inter-
national inflation and revaluation will include a need to
curtail a part of Iran's aid programs. Prime Minister Amir
Abbas Hoveyda emphasized this possibility in an interview
with Kayhan International : "'The real purchasing power of
our oil income is on the decline due to world inflation....
Si

We are, therefore, forced to think of the volume of our aid
to various countries.'" [93: 23 Nov 74]
Many Third World states have received aid from Iran in-
cluding Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, the Egyptian
2
Arab Republic, the Sudan, and Senegal. While this aid is
partly in the form of grants or long-term loans at little or
no interest, Iran is also anxious to develop joint ventures
which will directly benefit both nations involved.
The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), like Iran, does
not easily fit into the classification of the Third World.
The P.R.C. actively projects an image of an agrarian society
struggling to develop in a world dominated by the industrial
powers, the Soviet Union and the United States with their re-
spective blocs. However, the P.R.C, with its vast natural
manpower resources, has done much to develop and to industri-
alize and must be considered to be a world power on nearly
the same level as the U.S.S.R. and the United States.
The Shahanshah has used his troops actively to combat
3the Maoist-oriented forces of PFLOAG in Dhofar^ and he has
no more desire to witness the spread of Chinese Communism in
the Middle East than he does the Soviet variety. This does
not cause Iran to ignore the existence of the P.R.C; rather,
the monarch is working to improve Sino-Iranian relations and
to expand trade between the two.
Iran's economic foreign policy has unquestionably enhanced




country serves as an example for developing states. His
Imperial Majesty can be understandably proud of his nation's
achievements during the three decades that he has reigned.
Domestic policies have resulted in vast social reforms which
have transformed a traditional, feudal society into a modern
state in a matter of a generation.
The Shah is grateful that his nation was one of the first
to receive American aid under Lend-Lease in the early 1950' s;
now he quickly points out to reporters that Iran no longer
receives foreign aid; it pays for what it acquires and is in
a position to offer aid to those countries in a less fortun-
ate position. He replied to a Paris press conference, "You
also spoke about U.S. armaments aid; such aid does not exist.
We pay cash for weapons." [93: 6 Jul 74]
The Iranian monarch is also a world leader in promoting
5international cooperation and understanding. He consistent-
ly advocates that countries find peaceful solutions for dis-
putes, and Iran actively seeks the ban of nuclear weapons
proliferation through the nation's efforts toward making the
Indian Ocean and the Middle East "zones of peace" and "nuclear-
free regions."
Le Point magazine, published in France, proclaimed the
Shahanshah its "Man of the Year" for 1974 as reported by
Iranian sources: "'He symbolizes better than his Arab neigh-
bours the crashing resurgence of the Third World. '.. .The
63

Monarch's leadership would soon enable Iran to join the club
of great powers." [93: 11 Jan 75]
An article originating from Singapore and authored by
Eckhard Budewig states, "The Shahanshah has become the 'man
of the hour' of the Third World countries worst hit by high
prices of oil and industrial goods alike." This group of na-
tions is termed "a Third Front, developing nations lacking
petroleum reserves, which rejects U.S. power politics as well
as the Arab oil policy." These states look to Iran for
assistance as its monarch "has made it known that he wants to
share his country's oil revenues with the developing countries
by investing in their economic reconstruction." [93: 5 Oct 74]
Iran is clearly a developing nation requiring and receiv-
ing more attention in world affairs. The concept of the
"Third World" was a convenient device to group the states
which did not easily fit into the two Cold War camps, the Free
World and the Communist Bloc. Applying such a label is too
restrictive in the case of Iran. Certainly the nation sym-
pathizes with what might be termed the Third World, but the
key element of His Imperial Majesty's approach to decision-
making is Iranian independence.
Independent action characterizes the Shahanshah' s domes-
tic reform measures. These have progressed from the grants
of royal lands to the six-points originally comprising the
White Revolution which matured into the Revolution of the
Shah and the People. The ultimate aim is to reach the
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Great Civilization, within the next ten years if possible.
In this state Iran will have achieved widespread social re-
form, the population will be well-fed, well-housed, and well-
educated. The standard of living for all Iranians will be
high and the people will have the educational background
essential for democratic participation in the government.
The Shahanshah will still be the head of state, as per
the 1906 constitution, but the people will be better able to
participate in Iranian decision-making.. Iran will also be
able to make the transition from the rule of Mohammed Reza
Shah to that of his son, Crown Prince Reza, without political
disruptions.
The Great Civilization concept embodies an international
dimension to complement the domestic one. By pursuing inde-
pendent foreign policies the Shahanshah will help to insure
that Iran will be an active nation in all areas of the world,
unhindered by any bloc affiliations. Toward this end the
Shah has "called for a new world economic order that would
ensure 'economic justice and equality' between the world's
industrial and developing countries." [94: 26 Oct 74] This
call for a new economic order may well signal that the Shah
is calling for a new international order which has Iran bridg-




B. THE INDUSTRIALIZED V/ORLD
Iran is leading the oil exporting states in the transi-
tion from a source of raw materials for Western industry to
a supplier of resources for the international market. The
Shahanshah strongly disputes Western allegations that in-
creasing oil prices are a direct cause of the inflation
problems now plaguing industrialized states. As the Shah
told delegates at the conference to revise the Fifth Plan,
For about 26 years our natural riches were plundered,
every day more savagely than the previous one. In
1947, the posted price of oil in the Persian Gulf was
$2.17 per barrel. By 1969, it had been chipped away
to $1.79. Meanwhile, the industrialised had raised
their commodities' rates from 300 to 400 per cent.
You can easily imagine how badly we had been taken in.
On the one hand, our purchasing power had shrunk so
low and, on the other hand, we had to buy their r
industrial goods at such high rates. [93: 10 Aug 74]
A major example of the Shah's independent action is policy
for a single price of oil based on the cost of providing
7alternative sources of energy. Before this price can be
determined, the developed world must realize that it will no
longer be able to enjoy the "luxury" of inexpensive petroleum.
[93: 3 Aug 74] By working within OPEC the Shah hopes that
Iran will lead a price restructuring which would ensure that
all member exporters would benefit; this would enhance Iran's
leadership role within OPEC.
The United States has figured significantly in Iran's
development and is likely to continue to do so. Iran's value
in the United States' security system which linked the north-
ern Tier" states of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to the United
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States in CENTRO once was a strong bargaining point to re-
quest American aid. Iran no longer requires financial assist-
ance and military aid from Washington, D. C, preferring to
purchase foreign goods outright. The Shah will be unable to
forget that support from the United States was so significant
in resolving the Azerbaijan difficulties with the Soviet
Union. Also, aid from the United States was instrumental in
developing Iran after World War II.
Irano-American relations continue to be strong. Many-
Iranian students, both military and civilian, come to this
country for education which is not yet adequately available
in Iran. Also, Iranian purchases of military equipment such
as the F—14 aircraft and the Spruance-class destroyers bene-
fit industry in the United States as well as bolster the
Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.
The recent warnings by President Ford and Secretary of
State Kissinger that the United States would possibly use
force in the Middle East if threatened by inadequate supplies
of petroleum do not seem to have greatly strained Irano-
American relations. The Shah has stated that the United
States* "threats of military intervention in the Middle East
to prevent strangulation of Western economies by the Arab
oil producing states has caused a 'dark and explosive' situa-
tion." [93: 18 Jan 75] The Shahanshah later stated, "But
strangulation would not occur, even in the case of a renewed
embargo, because many producer governments, including Iran,
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would not take part in it." [93: 15 Feb 75] The desired ef-
fect of Iran's actions toward the United States is probably
to accustom the latter to accept Iran as a nation ready to
assume a role of leadership among the world powers.
Iran is working to gain a more favorable economic rela-
tionship with the European Economic Community. Reporting an
interview of the Shah by Per Speigel , Iranian sources note,
"The Shahanshah said that Iran was entitled to special trad-
ing privileges with the Common Market because it would soon
provide the nine nations with 50 percent of their gas needs."
[93: 15 Feb 75] Since the collective organization was not
anxious to recognize Iran's potential as a trading partner a
few years ago, the latter has had to deal independently with
member nations. The agreement with West Germany permitting
Iran to purchase 2 5.04 percent interest in Krupp Steel is a
major achievement. This arrangement provided Iran with direct
access to much needed steel technology; in addition, Iran is
now represented on the board of Freid. Krupp GmbH, the parent
organization, and is participating in a joint investment
fund with the German group [93: 27 Jul 74]
A more recent attempt by Iran to purchase a package of
shares of Daimler-Benz stock and to establish a Mercedes-Benz
factory in Iran was unsuccessful; the shares were sold instead
o
to a German bank. "The monarch conceded that every country
has the right not to sell stocks in vitally important
companies, but added: 'Iran could probably have used some
SS

100,000 Mercedes-Benz cars. That may have made all the
difference in the economies of this company.'" [93: 25 Jan
75] A 1967 offer by Iran to attract the Volkswagen firm to
manufacture sedans in Iran was unsuccessful. With the chang-
ing economic situation, Volkswagen now would like to estab-
lish a plant in Iran, but the Shah was able to dismiss the
offer "not because it wants revenge, but because cars with
similar cylinder capacity are already being produced in Iran,
the monarch said." [93: 15 Feb 75]
France also has close economic ties with Iran. The Shah
admires the late General de Gaulle for his ability to pursue
France's interests, even when his policies were counter to
those of the United States. A visit by the Shahanshah to
France in June 1974 was highlighted by "the biggest-ever
agreement for technological cooperation between an oil produc-
ing nation and an industrial power," estimated to total five
billion dollars. Included were five nuclear power plants for
Iran and joint petroleum projects.
A massive trade protocol resulted from the Shahanshah'
s
visit to Paris. While the United States supplies most of
Iran's large, sophisticated weapons systems, France will be
the source for some Iranian weapons including fast search
boats. [93: 29 Jan 74]
Great Britain, struggling with severe financial diffi-
11
culties, has benefited from its relationship with Iran.
The latter has provided substantial aid to Britain and is
B9

ordering BOO Chieftain tanks for the Imperial Iranian Army.
[93: 15 Feb 75] The Shah referred to Britain's becoming an
oil producer with the following comment to the German press:
"'How much do you think Britain and Norway will charge you
for their North Sea oil and natural gas?'" [93: 11 May 74]
The Iranian press also quotes British Trade Secretary Peter
Shore as stating, "With its ability to transform its oil
wealth into major development of its industry, agriculture,
and infrastructure, it represents a market of first import-
ance for Britain." [93: 8 Feb 75]
Petroleum is a commodity much sought by Italy. The
Italian group, A. G.I. P., was one of the first to reach an
agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company after the
complete nationalization of oil in 1973 • On the occasion of
a December 1974 visit to Tehran by President Giovanini Leone,
the Shah "stressed the centuries-old cultural and political
relations between Iran and Italy and the major contributions
each country had made to civilisation." [93: 21 Dec 74]
Associated with the state visit was a three billion dollar
series of agreements concerning "a vast range of joint ven-
tures including steel, oil, petrochemicals, rubber, textiles,
aluminum, construction, agriculture, and capital good manu-
facture." [93: 21 Dec 74]
The Shahanshah is actively dealing with individual govern-
ments in Western Europe for two immediate purposes. Iran is
able to invest oil revenues in Europe and gain access to
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European technology through joint ventures. Also, the Shah
hopes that the resulting bonds between his nation and parti-
cularly France and Germany will enable Iran to receive pre-
ferential treatment in dealings with the E.C.C. as a whole.
A third result is that Iran is able once again to demonstrate
its ability to deal with the established European powers on
an equal basis. This gives rise to the Shah's claim that
Iran will soon rank with Britain, France, and even Germany
as a world power.
Iran, by being outside the United States' Free World
Bloc, has been free to develop commerce with the Communist
Bloc. Cordial relations with the Soviet Union, Iran's north-
ern neighbor, are essential for the former's survival. While
desiring to remain free from the Communist Bloc, the Shahanshah
has accepted aid in the past from the Soviet Union. [See
6?: 306] Iran's recent policy has been to pay for foreign
goods rather than to receive aid, and the most widely known
trade agreement between that country and the Soviet Union is
the so-called "Gas-for-Steel" treaty of 1966. 12
Iran's relations with the Eastern European states of the
Soviet Bloc are limited; however, the Shah is working to ex-
pand economic ties with several of these states. In conjunc- '
tion with a 1974 visit by President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria
to Tehran, "agreements worth well over $600 million in mutual
trade exchanges and joint ventures" were reported by Kahyan .
The arrangements were primarily agricultural and included
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meat and dairy products and facilities, fertilizer and trans-
portation. [93: 30 Nov 74] Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia
have also recently reached agreements involving primarily
meat and foodstuffs and associated facilities.
His Imperial Majesty's global policies center around two
issues: friendly relations and economic exchange. The Shah
hopes to insure his regional security by acquiring adequate
conventional forces to counter any reasonable attack threat.
He realizes that a global conflict, a nuclear exchange be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States, would be dis-
astrous for Iran and the world. Therefore, he is a strong
supporter of detente .
The Shahanshah's global security considerations are
simplified by the devastating nature of the circumstances.
Hence, his major global policy decisions involve Iran's
economic relations with other states. While linking his na-
tion closely with the industrialized countries of Western
Europe plus the United States, the Shah is pursuing invest-
ments in other areas: Australia, Canada, the Soviet Bloc,
and the Third World. This promotes Iran's global friendships
and is a hedge against Western inflation.
Iranian investments in Europe are designed to provide
Iran with technology and non-oil income; but they also serve
to stave off financial collapse of the industrialized West.
The Shah realizes that the oil producing states must "think
of the economy of the whole world. . .because if the world
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collapses we shall collapse with it. We belong to that world,
We belong to that that you call—the so-called—free world.
And we do not want to see you collapse because we are going




See p. 71 above.
2
In July 1974 "the Shah told a Paris press conference,
"We have so far unilaterally placed $3,000 million at the
disposal of the United Nations. At the same time, we are
pressing for the acceptance of our proposal for a neutral
world development fund." [93: 6 Jul 74
J
3Refer to pages 51-52 above.
^See [Refs. 46 and 112],
5The Shahanshah greatly rates the "humanitarianism of
the Persian spirit" as "one of the virtues and qualities of
Old Persia" he most admires [93: 14 Dec 74]; see also [75].
/
See pages 1&-21 above.
7This approach has been used repeatedly especially with
Westerners; for example, with the American Press [93: 9 Nov
74] and with French newsmen [93: 6 Jul 74].
During his July 1973 visit to the United States, the
Shahanshah reasserted his independent policy while appearing
on "Meet the Press": "We are not the toys of any country,
including the United States; we are friends, maybe as close
as any friends could be, but we are not receiving orders and
we are not puppets." [93: 4 Aug 73]
Q
yA recent interview with Per Speigel magazine contains
interesting questions from the ~G~erman interviewers relating
to this and related issues. [93: 12 Jan 74]
During remarks welcoming the late French President
Georges Pompidou to Tehran, the Shah remarked "that Iran and
France pursued similar policies, adding that this similarity
became greater during the 'new era' inagurated by General
Charles de Gaulle in France's overall policies." [93: 22 Sep
73]
11Anglo-Iranian relations have not always been the best;
regarding the British withdrawal of forces from the Persian
Gulf Iran's monarch stated to the London Times
,
"'We have
never regarded British presence in the Gulf as being for us.
It has always been against us. It was your Government deci-
sion to go and we shall not invite you back.'" [93:14 Jun 69]




His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi is un-
questionably one of the most important political actors in
the Middle East, and he is a leading statesman in the world.
He is determined to see his nation prosper and once again
experience the glory of world leadership known by ancient
Persia. His nation has the blessing of vast petroleum re-
serves which will greatly assist Iran to attain the
Shahanshah's goal of the Great Civilization.
To undestand Iran one must both appreciate its centuries-
old tradition and be familiar with its prime decision-maker,
the Shahanshah. Persian kingship is an integral part of
Iran's heritage; Mohammed Reza Shah's execution of his per-
ceived mission—his approach to the "job" of being King—to
a great extent determines Iran's future.
The "operational code" approach is one method with which
to systematically evaluate an actor's political belief sys-
tem. The code helps to discover how the subject views the
political universe and his perceived role in it. The code
also helps to understand the actor's political behavior.
However, as Professor George states, "Such a belief system
influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-
making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that
shapes decision-making behavior." [151:191]
This perhaps is the largest drawback to applying the
"operational code" technique to analyze political actors.
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The method is not complicated; therefore, it is easy to for-
get that the results from this approach only partially ex-
plain the actor's political behavior. By itself, the "opera-
tional code" only provides information on the actor's belief
system. Many other social, political, and economic factors
2
also bear on decision-making behavior.
The major strength of the code is that it provides a
framework within which one can systematically examine and
evaluate an actor's beliefs and perceptions. In the course
of this research the "operational code" proved to be a valua-
ble aid for the second portion of the project, analyzing the
political actions of Mohammed Reza Shah. Developing the code
and then proceeding with a content analysis as was done here
provided a valuable tool for understanding the "why" as well
as the "what" of the behavior. The results are of necessity
general as the method does not fully account for externali-
ties with which the decision-maker must cope but which are
outside the scope of his belief set. An approach combining
the "operational code" and content analysis could be readily
applied by analysts in the intelligence community to produce
decision-making profiles of major political and military
actors.
The set of beliefs discerned using the "operational code"
applies only to the actor analyzed. This is perhaps an obvi-
ous statement, but it must be remembered that a code derived
for Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi applies only to his set of
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beliefs and perceptions. A researcher wishing to analyze a
political statement or action of another Iranian elite would
not be correct in applying the results of the "operational
code" developed in Section II above. A code can be developed
for a decision-making group, such as in Nathan Leites' re-
search on the Soviet Politburo [Refs. 55 and 56], but the re-
sulting belief set would not necessarily be applicable to mem-
bers of the group when acting individually.
The "operational code" derived during this research pro-
ject indicates that Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi considers him-
self a monarch in the Persian kingship tradition coping with
problems of modernization and reform in a political universe
made uncertain by the constant threat of conflict. The Shah
is optimistic about his nation's ability to thrive and pros-
per in a world showing the strains of an imperialistic era
during which some nations advanced and industrialized at the
expense of others.
Mohammed Reza Shah has forged a strong bond with his
subjects, expressed by the Sixth of Bahman 1341 Referendum
3
and the resulting Revolution of the Shah and the People.
The monarch wishes to instill a sense of pride and responsi-
bility in his population as together they reach the Great
Civilization; this also will facilitate the transfer of
authority and power to his son, Crown Prince Reza.
As Iran strives to join the circle of industrial powers
in the world, the monarch is urging popular participation in
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Iran's expanding economy. This also helps to promote domes-
tic stability by giving farmers and factory workers a sense
of involvement in their nation's future just as the bureau-
crats and middle-class merchants are concerned with Iran's
continued expansion and prosperity.
Oil is the obvious key to the economic growth and the
industrial development of Iran. Fifteen years ago the mon-
arch had ambitious dreams for his state; today those dreams
are being realized. Social reform and modernization are es-
tablished objectives of Iranian policy. While actively pur-
suing his domestic programs, the Shanhanshah has worked hard
to establish an independent foreign policy.
His Imperial Majesty seeks international peace and dis-
armament. However, until these goals are realized, he is
working to insure Iran's survival. The Shah has built his
military to be a dominant force in the Middle East and South
Asia. Iran's Arab neighbors have strengthened their armed
forces, but with the objective of battling Israel. This
places Iran in a position of leadership in the Persian Gulf,
so important to Iran's petroleum industry.
The Shahanshah wishes his country to be a leader and an
example in the Middle East and the rest of the Third World.
While supporting the Muslim Arabs' cause to regain lost terri-




To the east, the Shah wishes to see peace and stability-
mark the relations between Pakistan and India. One of Iran's
goals is to promote the economic development of South Asia.
Iran is already more advanced than most of the neighboring
states working to develop, and this would put Iran in a posi-
tion of leadership in any regional development system which
might evolve in the Indian Ocean littoral region.
Mohammed Reza Shah is determined to improve Iran's posi-
tion in the world community. He well remembers the conditions
under which he ascended the Peacock Throne three decades ago:
his nation was occupied by the British and the Russians, and
Iran suffered greatly during the Second World War. Post-war
recovery was aided largely by the American Lend-Lease program;
however, Iran was unable to follow an independent course of
political action. The nation's valuable petroleum resources
were controlled by foreign concerns under oil concessionary
agreements.
Nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1951 "further
confirmed Persia' sovereignty over her own oil industry" ac-
cording to the Shah, [67:112] but it was not until 31 July
1973 that the National Iranian Oil Company took full control
over Iran's valuable resource. Other oil producing states •
can be expected to follow, gaining complete sovereignty over




Third World states not enjoying the fortune of oil re-
serves, the "Third Front" which must import both oil products
and finished goods, will continue to look to Iran and to
other producers neither part of the Arab oil bloc nor the
5industrial states. Iran will not only be a country progress-
ing rapidly with industrialization, it will have the continued
respect and support of the Third World.
The Shahanshah hopes to enter the small circle of indus-
trial powers. However, he intends to enter the group with an
independent, Iranian policy. He does not care to associate
his nation with "Capitalism," "Communism," or any other
"-ism"; rather he intends to reassert the Persian tradition,
marked by humanitarian ideals. This heritage which spans
more than two millenia, has much more significance to the most
recent monarch of an age-old tradition than could any of the
"recent" "-isms."
A primary objective of this research project was to con-
centrate on Iranian press information when analyzing the
political behavior of the Shahanshah. This was to try to
avoid possible biases of non-Iranian sources. Use of the
"operational code" to determine Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi's
political belief system proved extremely valuable as a means
to counter the researcher's own "Western bias"; as one begins
to study an actor's code, one easily begins to apply to




This research project would be incomplete, however, were
it not to include some observations of His Imperial Majesty
from the researcher's Western orientation to complement what
hopefully has been an unbiased examination of the Shahanshah's
belief system and its applicability to political action.
Alvin J. Cottrell, in an article titled "Explaining Iran's
Actions" reprinted from the Washington Post by Kayhan Inter-
national
,
has observed the following:
One key country whose motives have been particularly
misunderstood or distorted, intentionally or not , by
press reports and analysts, is Iran. The gist of a
number of these reports and some statements by a
highly-placed U.S. Government official seems to be
that the Shah's arms and oil policies are at best
irrational and at worst motivated by greed. This
interpretation seems to reflect a myopic percep-
tion of the Shah's intentions and of the factors that
are impinging upon his policies. [93: 21 Dec 74]
The West cannot ignore Iran any more than it can deny the
latter the right to develop its vast resources and join the
"industrial nations club." Too easily, Western observers are
tempted to view Iran with the same eye as the other states
of the Middle East, disregarding such facts as Iran is a
Persian rather than Arabic state, the Shi' a sect of Islam
predominating in Iran distinguishes the nation from its
Sunni Muslim Arab neighbors, and Iran's "constitutional mon-
archy" founded on twenty-five centuries of Persian Kingships
is quite different from other Middle Eastern governments.
The Middle East recently has been the focus of much
Western attention: the Arab-Israeli conflict has affected
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states of the West either directly, as with American aid to
Israel, or indirectly, as a result of the Arab embargo pro-
gram.
The oil boycott imposed by the Arab petroleum exporting
nations proved to be a valuable weapon in the Arab world's
struggle with Israel. The West benefited from the Shahanshah's
continuing position that Iranian oil would be used construc-
tively for his nation's development; Iran's support for its
Muslim brothers in the Arab world does not include sympathetic
participation in the Arab boycott program. Rather, Iran's
objective has been to work with the West to tie the price of
oil to that of the latter' s industrial goods.
The United States and other Western nations have greatly
benefited from economic relations with Iran. In addition to
being a dependable source of petroleum, the Middle Eastern
nation's capital investments have particularly aided British,
French, German and American industries.
Iran's choice of the United States as a supplier of major
weapons systems may provide the latter with valuable informa-
tion. Hopefully, American military units will not become
engaged in combat with the Imperial Iranian armed forces; how-
ever, should expensive, American-made systems such as F-14
aircraft or Spruance-class destroyers be utilized by Iran
against other states in the Middle East or South Asia, the
United States might gain experience lessons without the
involvement of American forces or equipment.
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The United States has a valuable Middle Eastern ally in
Iran. The nation and its monarch must be considered as ready
to recognize both the effect of the Persian tradition on the
Shahanshah and his nation's potential role in the security of
the Indian Ocean region.
American forces should maintain the capability to oper-
ate world-wide in the interests of the United States. How-
ever, encouragement of a regional defense agreement in line
with that proposed by the Shah could reduce the potential ex-
pense of more frequent visits to the Indian Ocean by American
naval units or permanently basing forces in the region.
A Westerner cannot easily understand the complexities of
the Persian tradition; however, the increasingly important
position of Iran in the world makes it imperative for Western
analysts and observers to acquaint themselves with Iranian
values and traditions. In Iran the monarchy has been a
thriving force behind modernization and reform moves as well
as a long-standing custom.
Iran's rapid development during the last three decades
is quite commendable; the United States in particular must be
aware that the Middle Eastern kingdom is no longer a struggl-
ing, underdeveloped state highly dependent on American foreign-
aid as protection for survival. The Shahanshah is succeeding
to build a strong nation: one that is capable to support
itself in the modern international community and one that
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will be able to survive the transition of authority from
Mohammed Reza Shah to Crown Prince Reza Cyrus.
The preceding two centuries have marked a low ebb in the
Persian experience. The forceful character of Reza Shah es-
tablished the Pahlavi Dynasty, but the reign of his son,
Mohammed Reza Shah, has seen Iran reborn from the desolation





'See [Refs. 12 and 67].
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Refer to [Refs. 43 and 4$ J for approaches to government-
al decision making.
Pages 18-21 above.
See pages 49-50 above.
See page $4 above.
The Shashanshah has strong religious beliefs: for the
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